هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ: العربية (Arabic)

MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN DETENTION CENTERS

DEPRIVATION OF EVERYTHING

Report on visits to 190 detention centers managed by the Directorate General of Internal Security Forces – Ministry of Interior and the Lebanese Army – Ministry of Defense 

Executive summary 

 

1. This report includes the findings of 228 visits to 190 detention centers managed by the Directorate General of Internal Security Forces – Ministry of Interior and the Lebanese Army – Ministry of Defence from July 1 to December 30, 2023. 
2.  In the framework of the project of the National Human Rights Commission, supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and focused on monitoring the situation of human rights in detention centers in Lebanon, whether in terms of documenting the application of the articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure, especially the promotion of key guarantees and the enforcement of defense rights, or in terms of documenting the conditions of detainees, the Commission made 228 visits 182 detention centers of the Directorate General of Internal Security Forces – Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, and 8 detention centers of the Lebanese Army – Ministry of National Defence. The 182 initial visits were followed by 38 second or third visits to many centers of the Directorate General of Internal Security Forces, if needed. 
3. Visits to Lebanese Army detention centers were superficial, as the experts were unable to ascertain the true situation inside these prisons due to their limited access to information. They were not allowed to freely roam around and were always accompanied by a Lebanese Army official during all visits. Some of their questions were unanswered, particularly those related to Lebanese Army intelligence, and they were unable to verify the allegations of torture by Lebanese Army intelligence.  
4. The report concludes that violations against detainees in all detention centers are due to a severe overcrowding in these centers, which affects the health and judicial conditions, and reduces capacity to secure enough food for all. The most important point is that detention centers are playing now the role of prisons, although they don’t meet yet the required standards for long-term detention. This report aims at combining and summarizing all the reports and studies developed by the team in a comprehensive report that sheds light on the main monitored violations and relevant analyses under national and international laws that support human rights, in order to reach comprehensive findings, make recommendations, and suggest solutions.  
5. The report concludes that detaining juveniles, both male and female, with adults, in places of detention affiliated with the Internal Security Forces, and interrogating them without the presence of a juvenile representative, in many cases, contradicts the Lebanese Law for the Protection of Juveniles in Conflict, and Article (107) of the Code of Procedure, as well as international laws. Which protects the rights of juveniles and children deprived of their freedom.
6. The report concludes that the lack of female officers to take care of female detainees in ISF detention centers, which increases the possibility of their exposure to verbal and physical abuse, in contravention of the articles of Decree 14310 on the rights of women deprived of their liberty and the Bangkok Rules.
7. The detention places affiliated with the Internal Security Directorate suffer from the poor quality and small quantities of food provided to detainees, the lack of a safe source of drinking water in the detention centers affiliated with it, the periodic interruption of water for use in them, and the lack of electricity, which prevents the use of necessary electrical appliances. Such as air conditioners, extractors, and fans. And a violation of human rights in terms of privacy, hygiene, and exposure to sunlight.
8. The report concludes that there is inequality between detainees in detention centers in Lebanon with regard to the right to communication, visits and confrontations, and the problems of the market before the courts and the resulting violation of the rights of detainees and delays in conducting their trials.
9. The report concludes that there is a wrong and incomplete understanding of Article (47) of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure by members of the judicial police, focusing on one part over the other, and limiting its application to recording it in the investigation report without reading it clearly. In addition to suspected detainees’ ignorance of their rights stipulated in the article and their lack of awareness of the importance of benefiting from them. There is no mechanism to implement Article 47 in its entirety, such as installing recording cameras. There are also violations related to the application of Article (108) of the Lebanese Code of Procedure, which guarantees that no person is deprived of his freedom without legal justification, and the failure to abide by it with regard to respecting the period of detention, especially since it requires amending it to become more consistent with international laws in terms of preventing arbitrary arrest. And the lack of respect for Article (402) of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure regarding judicial supervision, except by some judges in the palaces of justice and on a few occasions.

Legal Framework

 

1. The National Human Rights Commission that includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (NHRC-CPT) for the year 2023 draws on the Paris Principles that support the mechanisms of establishment and activity of the National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), the provisions of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT), adopted on December 18, 2002, which Lebanon joined under Law No. 12 of September 5, 2008, and the provisions of Law No. 62 of October 27, 2016 (establishing the National Human Rights Commission, which includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture) and its amendments, particularly article 26, which stipulates that the Committee shall develop its observations, recommendations, and suggestions on the places of deprivation of liberty and the conditions of persons deprived of their liberty, and shall submit them to the Commission and competent authorities, in order to improve the terms and conditions of deprivation of liberty and the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, protect, and avoid the vulnerability of such persons to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Regarding arbitrarily detained persons, the Committee notifies the competent administrative and judicial authorities about their status so that these authorities take adequate legal and judicial proceedings in this regard, in order to put an end to their illegal detention. Through the Commission, the Committee expresses its opinion and provides observations, recommendations, and suggestions regarding the draft laws or suggested amendments on the enforced laws that are related to the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, their detention, the conditions of places of deprivation of liberty, and the proceedings of a fair trial. 
2. The Commission was established under Decree No. 3267 of June 19, 2018. The Committee was established under Decree No. 5147 of July 5, 2019. The Commission provided a summary of this report in its second annual report for the year 2023.

1. Lebanon has become a party to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and a party to the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) in 2008. On September 19, 2017, the Lebanese Parliament issued Law No. 65/2017 that criminalizes torture, but does not meet Lebanon’s obligations under the United Nations’ convention.

1. The Committee for the Prevention of Torture operates within the framework of the Commission on protecting the rights of detained persons and those deprived of their liberty in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 62/2016,  and in accordance with Lebanon’s obligations under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol.   

1.  Law No. 62/2016 defines the tasks of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture as follows: The Committee for the Prevention of Torture works within the Commission to protect the rights of the detained and persons who are deprived of their liberty in accordance with the provisions of this law, and in accordance with Lebanon’s obligations under the Optional Protocol to the “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment.” The Committee, in the sense of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, assumes the functions of the national preventive mechanism, in order to protect the rights of those detained and deprived of their liberty, and it has an independent legal personality in everything related to torture and its prevention. The Committee or whomever it delegates among its members and accompanying staff or contractors, have the absolute power to enter and visit all places of deprivation of liberty, their installations and facilities in Lebanon without any exception, with the aim of protecting the persons present therein from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and from arbitrary arrest and cooperation with and dialogue with the competent authorities, in order to activate and develop laws and regulations related to detainees and places of deprivation of liberty. The Committee or whomever it delegates among its members can:

a- Carry out periodic or unannounced visits at any time to places of deprivation of liberty without prior notice and without the need for permission from any administrative or judicial authority or any other party.

b- Conduct group or private interviews in private with persons deprived of their liberty, free from any censorship, and in the presence of a Translator if necessary.

c- Meet with any other person who may provide relevant information or assistance that the Committee deems necessary, and to exercise an unrestricted power to obtain information in a confidential manner as required by the work of the Committee. It does not publish any of the information without the consent of the owner or source of the information.

d- Receive complaints or interview requests from the aforementioned, or conduct medical examinations. Article 27/b of Law No. 62/2016 also authorizes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture to communicate directly with the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and to provide it with information when necessary, and to meet with it periodically or whenever necessary.

1. The Commission expresses its concern about the ongoing acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in many places of deprivation of liberty in Lebanon, which many of them shall be closed and where detainees shall be moved to less dangerous places, as mentioned in the report of the National Committee for the Prevention of Torture to the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture.

1. The Committee denies the determination of Lebanese successive governments to keep the reports of the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture confidential. The State is entitled to do so, according to international agreements. However, many parties, including the United Nations’ subcommittee, encourage authorities to publish their reports, especially that they allege that they have nothing to hide. 

1. Since its inception, the Commission enhanced its performance and work to visit and monitor the places of deprivation of liberty, with the aim to reduce any potential torture cases within these places. 

Methodology

1. In this report, the term “Commission” will be used to refer to the National Human Rights Commission which includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture. The term “Committee” will be used to refer to the Committee for the Prevention of Torture. 

1. In its discussions with the Lebanese authorities regarding this report, the Commission reserves the right to express more comments on any visited place, whether this place is mentioned in this report or not. If the current report lacks any comment about any detention facility or place visited by the Commission, this shall not mean that the Commission has a positive or negative view about it.

1. The report is careful not to include any personal or detailed data that reveal the identity of the victims or witnesses without their consent. The Commission was established to protect and promote human rights in accordance with the standards set forth in the Lebanese Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the international conventions and treaties related to human rights, and the Lebanese laws that are consistent with these standards, in addition to performing the special tasks specified in this law. In this regard, it may communicate independently with international and local bodies concerned with human rights. 

1. The members of the National Human Rights Commission that includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture who made the visits are: Doctor Fadi Gerges (Commission’s Chairman) and Doctor Josyan Madi Skaff (Member of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture). The Commission was supported by five experts under contract with the Commission: Joseph Kallas, Nicole Ghanem, Fidaa Abdul Fattah, Naela Nahle, and Munawar Haddad. 

1. The goals of strategic visits were:

(a) Monitor the situation of human rights in detention centers, document the scope of application of the Code of Criminal Procedure, especially the key guarantees, and activate the defence rights, especially the application of the amended article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure under Law No. 191/2020.

(b) Document the conditions of detainees and provide advice and technical assistance to the administration of detention centers on Lebanon’s treaty obligations under the Optional Protocol, taking into account the Guidelines on National Preventive Mechanisms. 

(c) Visit a number of places of deprivation of liberty to help the Lebanese State meet its obligations effectively under the Optional Protocol, in order to protect the persons deprived of their liberty against the risk of torture and ill-treatment. 

1. Experts conducted thorough monitoring using a detailed form with precise questions. This gathered information on detention center conditions, detainee well-being (health, legal, social), and individual detention rooms. Each visit was documented, and reports were created, including preliminary and evaluation reports. Legal studies were conducted with suggestions, experiences were exchanged, and recommendations as well specific interventions were raised accordingly. This process aimed to identify and address any violations through potential interventions.

1. Initially, detention center officials hampered the experts’ visits by questioning their authority and requesting verification of their work’s basis. The experts relied on the 2020 ISF memorandum of service and the Public Prosecution Office circular to establish their legitimacy. Over time, collaboration improved as the experts clarified that their role included monitoring conditions for both detainees and officials’ socio-economic conditions. This transparency led to better communication, with most detention centers becoming responsive to inquiries and follow-up calls.

1. During the information collection process, human rights violations were identified. The latter have in fact increased in light of the prevailing financial situation in the country, which affected the situation of ISF and LA members, as well as the judiciary. Therefore, it was decided to prepare studies on the information collected, raise recommendations and suggestions and propose solutions.

1. Visit activities were based on the Commission’s commitment to safeguarding the welfare and safety of the individuals and groups with whom it interacted. The Commission’s personnel strictly adhered to the “do no harm” principle in all of their activities. The Commission did not conduct an interview with anyone without their consent, and sought consent from sources for their information to be used and shared in the Commission reports and with external stakeholders.

1. Under international law, remedy and reparation must be provided to the victims of torture and ill-treatment; To this end, the sound documentation is very important to secure the rights to remedy and reparation. However, the importance of sound documentation of torture and ill-treatment goes beyond this issue. The adequate documentation enables the State parties to better understand what’s happening under their jurisdiction. This combined body of knowledge, including that related to the methods of torture used frequently, the cases where torture has occurred, the perpetrators who commit abuses, and the population at risk of torture, is the essential basis to develop preventive programs according to each case. It also describes the judiciary that must play a major role in punishing the perpetrators of torture and providing reparation to the victims of torture.

1. During their visits, experts adopted the guidelines included in the updated version of Istanbul Protocol, as it is the means to secure obtaining a systematic, strong, and evidence-based description for each form of torture and ill-treatment. The said protocol also provides a systemic approach to evaluate the coherence between the narrative history and clinical outcomes, and enables States to undertake the necessary analysis and use data for preventive purposes.

1. During its visits, the team abided by the guidelines issued by the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture on advice relating to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, and the Protocol for national preventive mechanisms undertaking on-site visits during the coronavirus disease COVID-19 pandemic. Since COVID-19 is still prevalent, the National Human Rights Commission acts with due care, and reiterates its concern about not maintaining, in many detention centers in Lebanon, the procedures and improvements that had been included to the adopted measures to minimize the impact of the pandemic. 

1. The team of experts abided by the by-laws and Code of Ethics of the National Human Rights Commission that includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, which are binding rules to all its members, personnel, employees, representatives of associations, and the rest of persons who cooperate with it to implement its functions. This code of ethics is based on the content of the following instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Preamble of the Constitution, the clause b of Law No. 62 of 27/10/2016, the Code of Conduct of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-holders of the Human Rights Council (HRC), the Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct of the World Health Organization (WHO), the Secretary-General’s bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse, and the Non-binding Guidelines on the use of Social Media by Judges, issued by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Global Judicial Integrity Network (GJIN).  

Chapter I: Violations in detention centers of juveniles

First: Legal framework 

1. Lebanon’s Law No. 422/2002 on the Protection of Juveniles defines a “juvenile in conflict with the law” as someone under 18 who commits a criminal offense. This aligns with the term “child” used in other laws and international agreements.

1. Due to their age and ongoing physical and mental development, juveniles need special safeguards and care. This principle is enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Lebanon ratified in 1991.   In addition to the Law on the Protection of Juveniles in Conflict with the Law or at Risk No. 422/2002 promulgated on 6/6/2002, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (known as the Beijing Rules), the Arab Framework on the Rights of the Child (2001), as well as instructions, recommendations, and legal process related to juveniles.

1. All juvenile-related laws prioritize the child’s best interests. This is determined on a case-by-case basis, considering the short- and long-term impacts of any action. The evaluation prioritizes fundamental human rights principles including children’s rights, non-discrimination, the right to express and to be heard, access to food and development, safety, and confidentiality. Lebanon’s Law on the Protection of Juveniles outlines specific rights during investigations, sentencing, and detention. However, the Commission’s visits to detention centers revealed concerning violations of these rights. These observations included (a) failure to verify juvenile age, (b) temporary detention in adult police stations, (c) pre-trial detention exceeding legal limits, (d) interrogations without juvenile representatives, (e) denied access to a lawyer during questioning (violating Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), (f) deprivation of visitation rights and contact with the outside world (in some cases).

Second: The juvenile’s uncertain age

1. Visits to detention centers revealed that some detainees lacked visible signs of puberty or appeared underage yet were held in adult police stations. This practice directly contradicts Lebanon’s legal framework. In one instance, a detainee was arrested and tried based on a self-declared identity, only to reveal a different one after acquittal. This raises serious concerns about age verification procedures. When questioned about how they verify identity and age, detention center officials stated they rely on detainee or family-provided documents if official identification is unavailable.

1. Article 1 of the Law on the Protection of Juveniles in Conflict with the Law or at Risk stipulates that “Age shall be established by proper official records or based on medical expertise sought out by the judicial authority handling the case. If the records do not mention the day and month of birth, the person shall be deemed to have been born on the first day of July of the year specified for their birth. The matter shall be handled in such manner if it is not possible to determine the day and month using medical expertise where it must be relied on. The juvenile’s age on which a ruling is based shall be deemed to be final with regard to enforcement of the measures or penalties imposed under the ruling.”

Third: Temporary detention of juveniles in adult lockups

1. The visits made by the experts to detention centers revealed that in some centers juveniles are detained in adult police stations, including the Military Police station in the North and the Nabatieh police station. Some female minors detained in the Dahr al-Bashek prison said that they had been detained in police stations with adult women until an arrest warrant was issued against them. After investigation, it was revealed that there are no police stations dedicated to female minors in the temporary detention centers (police stations). Female minors are detained in cells dedicated to women, in violation of the laws, especially Paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the Lebanese Law on the Protection of Juveniles in Conflict with the Law or at Risk.

Fourth: Failure of pre-trial detention to respect the legal time limits set by law 

1. The visits revealed that a significant number of juveniles are detained for a period exceeding the legal pre-trial detention period stipulated in the Code of Criminal Procedure. In addition, a number of them had been held in garde à vue for over forty-eight hours, in contravention of Articles 107 and 108 of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Rules 13, 17, and 20 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice.

Fifth: Interrogation of juveniles in the absence of the representative of juveniles and being satisfied with the presence of parents

1. Experts’ visits to juvenile detention centers and interviews with minors revealed another concerning issue. In some cases, minors couldn’t differentiate between the juvenile representative and ISF members in civilian clothes. When asked about the presence of a juvenile representative during interrogations, responses were unclear. Some said they “didn’t know,” while others confirmed having only one person present or the representative attending remotely via video call.

1. Detention center officials acknowledged some instances where the juvenile representative couldn’t attend interrogations due to late hours or transportation issues. In these cases, they relied on video calls, raising concerns about the effectiveness of remote participation.  Additionally, officials claimed a judge’s order could suffice for family presence to replace the representative, a practice lacking legal basis.  Furthermore, during remote interrogations by judges, the representative was present in the judge’s office, not at the detention center where the juvenile was being questioned.

1. The law mandates the presence of a juvenile representative during interrogations to safeguard the child’s well-being. This representative provides psychological support, monitors procedures, and protects the child from pressure or violence. They also educate minors about their rights.  The absence of a representative during questioning negates these crucial protections. Leaving the child alone with investigators hinders the representative’s ability to ensure no abuses occur, constituting a violation of Article 34 of Lebanon’s Law on the Protection of Juveniles.

Sixth: Non-commitment to the application of article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

1. Interviews with the investigating officers and officials in juvenile detention centers revealed that a number of them restrict the procedures observed during the interrogation of minors to contacting the juvenile representative. As for inquiring whether the suspect wishes to appoint a lawyer as per Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ,  they deem this step does not constitute a condition for interrogating juveniles. This however is a flawed and limited understanding of the law. In fact, Article 42 of the Law on the Protection of Juveniles in Conflict with the Law or at Risk stipulates that “The presence of a lawyer alongside the juvenile is compulsory in criminal and other trials. If the juvenile’s family or those concerned with their affairs do not attempt to secure a lawyer where required, the court may assign a lawyer or request one from the lawyer’s syndicate.”

1. In addition, Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enumerates the rights of the suspect or person complained of in general, without restricting them to adults. Therefore, the rights set out in that article shall be enjoyed primarily by juveniles, as well those featured in the Law on the Protection of Juveniles in Conflict with the Law or at Risk.

Seventh: Deprivation of juveniles of the right to meeting and communication

1. Lebanon’s juvenile detention centers mirror the harsh conditions found in adult facilities. Family visits, a fundamental human right, are often restricted. The Commission’s experts observed that in many centers, meetings occur behind police station doors, lacking dedicated spaces for minors to meet their loved ones. Additionally, phone contact with the outside world is inconsistent. While some centers offer this option, others, like Dahr al-Bashek prison for girls, severely limit it. There, girls reported being unable to contact their families for three weeks due to a lack of functioning phone equipment (no Telecart).

1. This is considered a violation of minors’ rights to communicate with the outside world, as Paragraph (c) of Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides for the right of a child deprived of his/her liberty to maintain contact with his/her family through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances.

1. The United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty emphasize this right in Article 59 and subsequent articles.

1. It should be noted here that there are many Syrian detainees, including juveniles, who enter the country clandestinely. If they get arrested on suspicion of a crime other than entering clandestinely or disrupting their stay, their acquittal from the latter crime does not shield them from being detained by the General Security for entering Lebanon illegally. Subsequently, they spend several months in police stations, eventually turning into a burden and causing disturbance, while their rights as juveniles are violated due to the lack of a mechanism allowing for their repatriation by General Security.

Chapter II: Violations in detention centers of women

First: Legal framework 

1. Women’s prisons in Lebanon generally experience less overcrowding compared to other facilities. The Ministry of Justice appointed female prison directors and female internal guards, whereas the work of the male officers is restricted to the outer security of the prison. Positive features observed include cleanliness, tidiness, and medical care in these prisons, with the permanent presence of nurses, in addition to activities carried out by women prisoners. Notably, ISF women’s detention cells, originally intended for short-term holding (48 hours), have become de facto prisons. During visits to these ISF stations, the National Human Rights Commission documented violations.

Second: Severe overcrowding

1. ISF detention centers for women in Lebanon suffer from overcrowding. This is likely due to the limited number of women’s police stations and their transformation into de facto prisons, despite lacking the proper facilities and resources.

1. The limited number of women’s police stations forces authorities to detain women in facilities potentially far from their families and residences. This creates a significant burden, especially considering Lebanon’s current socio-economic challenges.  Compounding the problem, detention center officers are reportedly reluctant to transport female detainees to court, citing logistical difficulties especially that they are not the ones who detained her. On the other hand, the officers of the detention center that arrested her do not manage her situation given the distance. 

1. The situation of lesbian women in Internal Security Forces detention centers is very similar to that of women in terms of the suffering and violations they may face and the ill-treatment they receive due to the lack of respect many officers have for them. In addition, they do not have any dedicated cells and are placed in empty cells when they are detained until they are taken to the Qasr Adli Detention Center in Baabda, where there is a dedicated cell for them. 

1. In addition, the experts noted the presence of many foreign female workers in police stations, many of whom could not contact their embassies, nor did they have money to hire a lawyer or to purchase needed items. Some were also released regarding the crimes they committed but are still detained by the General Security due to the expiration of their legal residency in Lebanon. Placing them in the custody of the General Security is also problematic due to the lack of space, while they cannot be released, with unavailability of money to repatriate them, especially in the absence of associations or donors that can secure travel tickets.

Third: Shortage in female members in some platoons or police stations to take care of detainees, and violation of detainees’ privacy

1. The experts noted in the Beirut Bridge station the lack of female members to care for female detainees. This increases the possibility of their exposure to physical, verbal, or moral abuse due to their permanent presence with male guards, in contravention of Article 23 of Decree No. 14310, which stipulates that “Female prisoners shall be guarded and monitored by female guards appointed to this end.” Article (24) of the same decree stipulates that it is not permissible for any man, except a doctor, to enter women’s prison. The prison can only be visited by employees who have the right to carry out prison inspections.”
2. Moreover, the experts noted the presence of cameras in some detention rooms, which violates women’s privacy.

Fourth: Deprivation of the right to meeting and communication

1. Regarding the issue of contact with the outside world, experts found out that in most women’s ISF detention centers, it was ensured according to the officer’s whims and will.

1.  As for visits, they are restricted to two days per week, without extending their duration.

Fifth: Lack of necessary care and basic services

1. During their visits to women’s ISF detention centers, experts noted that female detainees are not referred to medical doctors or psychotherapists except in emergencies. Female prisoners do not undergo regular check-ups, in violation of the right to adequate health care stipulated in the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders known as the “Bangkok Rules”. They also noted that women’s special needs (such as clothes, sanitary pads, toiletries, and women’s medications) were not secured in these centers.

1. Furthermore, the experts identified a critical gap in childcare services for infants accompanying their mothers in detention. This lack of support for the children’s medical, health, and psychological needs violates the Bangkok Rules, which guarantee support for the children of female prisoners.

1. The visits also revealed a lack of support from charitable organizations for female detainees.

1. The experts also identified issues related to basic necessities for female detainees. Similar to male detainees, they face challenges accessing sufficient and nutritious food, often relying on family members to fulfill these needs.  Furthermore, access to clean water for drinking, bathing, and hygiene is difficult.  Detention centers lack essential amenities like air conditioning, heating, and reliable electricity.  Additionally, detainees reported infrequent changes of bed linens and insufficient blankets, and problems with water leaks and humidity.

Chapter III: Violations in detention centers of men

First: Overcrowding

1. Lebanon faces a critical challenge within its detention system: severe overcrowding, particularly in ISF facilities. This overcrowding is a major contributing factor to the dire conditions detainees experience, including inadequate food, drinking water, and sanitation. Additionally, these centers lack proper healthcare, suffer from power outages, and exhibit inconsistencies in granting detainees contact and visitation rights. A root cause of these issues appears to be the repurposing of police stations into long-term detention facilities for the ISF. These stations are simply not equipped to accommodate large numbers of detainees for extended periods, leading to a violation of their fundamental rights.

1. Overcrowding is a severe and systemic problem plaguing Lebanese detention facilities. The total capacity across all prisons, from the central prison to regional facilities and courthouse police stations, is estimated to be around 3,000 inmates. However, by December 2023, the detainee population had exceeded 7,800. This staggering number has resulted in dire overcrowding at Roumieh Central Prison, regional prisons, courthouse police stations, regional gendarmerie stations, Beirut police stations, judicial police unit stations nationwide, and even Military Police and LA Intelligence prisons.

1. Several factors contribute to this overcrowding crisis. A lack of new prison construction, delays in judicial proceedings from sentencing to release, and socio-economic issues that led to lengthy judicial strikes over the past two years are all contributing factors. Additionally, the presence of a large Syrian refugee population in Lebanon further strains the system, with estimates suggesting over 50% of detainees are Syrian nationals.
2. According to statistics of the Directorate of Prisons at the Ministry of Justice, the total number of prisoners in prisons reached 6155 by the end of 2023, including 5886 men, 107 of which are juveniles, and 269 women, 7 of which are minor girls. The total number of prisoners in lockups reached 354 by the end of 2023, including 350 men, one of which is a juvenile and 4 are women. Furthermore, the statistics of the Directorate of Prisons at the Ministry of Justice show that the total number of Syrian prisoners who entered jails by the end of 2023 was distributed as follows: 74 juvenile inmates (64.91%), 71 female inmates (31.65%), and 1624 male inmates (55.28%). The total number of Syrian prisoners who entered lockups by the end of 2023 was distributed as follows: one juvenile (100%), one female inmate (25.00%), and 105 male inmates (30.26%). Therefore, the overall rate of Syrian prisoners who entered jails and lockups by the end of 2023, compared to other nationalities, including the Lebanese nationality, was (46.72%). It is important to note that these numbers and rates include the convicted or arrested inmates or those who meet both status, who were counted by the automated Jail Management Software, and are present in official prisons and lockups of the palaces of justice. These statistics do not include those arrested in police stations and troops of the Directorate General of Internal Security Forces, or at the Lebanese Army, the Directorate General of General Security, or the Directorate General of State Security. 

1. This overcrowding constitutes a flagrant violation of international human rights standards regarding minimum space allocation per detainee in detention centers. These standards mandate 3.2 square meters of personal space for each detainee. The reality in many Lebanese facilities paints a grim picture: detainees are forced to take turns sleeping, with some standing while others sleep due to a lack of space. Others sleep on their sides crammed together, or even with half their bodies in bathrooms.  Beyond the blatant disregard for human rights, this extreme overcrowding creates breeding grounds for health problems and diseases, including scabies, allergies, and the spread of unpleasant odors due to body perspiration, especially during summer heatwaves.

1. International and national laws guarantee the right of detainees and arrested persons to adequate food and drink.  

Second: Food

1. The Commission’s observations during visits to ISF detention centers across Lebanon revealed concerning shortcomings in upholding this right. Detainees consistently reported issues with the quality and quantity of food provided. Meals were often of poor quality, delivered late and cold, and insufficient in portion size.  Furthermore, some centers lacked patrol vehicles or cited security concerns and not enough personnels as reasons for not delivering meals to detainees at all.  In these instances, detainees were expected to rely on food brought by family members or shared amongst fellow inmates. The report also documented cases of detainees going hungry for several days.

1. The practice of allowing detainees to keep money in ISF detention centers raises serious concerns about the potential for financial extortion. Additionally, the reliance on unreliable sources like local charities, leftover restaurant food, or even officers’ leftovers create an insecure and potentially unhealthy food supply.  

1. The lack of refrigeration for storing detainee-provided food further exacerbates these issues. For some mountain police stations, harsh weather conditions, including snowstorms, can disrupt food deliveries. 

1. In contrast, LA detention centers, while prohibiting outside food, provided a more consistent approach and provided food from their corresponding kitchen.  Detainees could deposit money and purchase meals from the on-site “soldier’s home.”

1. The funding provided to the army is being used effectively and is being utilized. The cells have been organized and equipped, and the quantity and quality of food are good and sufficient.

Third: Water

1. Access to clean water is another fundamental right denied to detainees in some detention centers. The Commission’s observations revealed a disturbing lack of dedicated water sources beyond bathroom taps at the ISF detention centers. Unlike food, contractors are not obligated to provide drinking water, placing the burden on families and detainees to purchase it, despite the knowledge that many lack visitors or financial resources.

1. In contrast, LA detention centers demonstrated a more consistent approach to water access. While some facilities provided water directly, others required detainees to contribute financially.

1. The Commission also identified critical issues regarding access to water for sanitation and hygiene in many ISF detention centers. Unlike drinking water, there seems to be no consistent system for supplying water for general use and bathing.  Facility staff often resort to unreliable sources like ISF tanks, municipalities, Civil Defense, or even regional donors to secure this essential resource.  Despite these efforts, water shortages persist, with some centers experiencing cut-offs for several days a week.  These shortages exacerbate sanitation problems, particularly during hot summer months.  The lack of water for bathing and hygiene contributes to unpleasant odors, increases the risk of skin conditions like scabies, and creates a breeding ground for potential outbreaks of disease.

1. The availability of showers also emerged as a concern. While some facilities provided daily showers and maintained clean rooms with readily available water, others exhibited a troubling decline in hygiene practices during colder months. Showering frequency could be reduced to just once or twice a week in the fall, with similar reductions in cleaning routines. In winter, the absence of hot water systems in over 90% of detention centers effectively suspended showering altogether in some facilities.  This reliance on cold showers, or the complete lack thereof, has a demonstrably negative impact on detainee hygiene, potentially contributing to the spread of disease.

Fourth: Electricity

1. Lebanon’s chronic power shortages pose a significant challenge for detention centers. While the ISF equips its facilities with generators, these are often unreliable due to a lack of maintenance and fuel scarcity caused by the country’s socio-economic woes.  The resulting limited electricity supply, typically less than two hours per day, significantly impacts conditions within detention centers.  Essential equipment, including air conditioning, fans, ventilation systems, and lighting, all rely on electricity.  The absence of proper ventilation and cooling during summer months, especially with overcrowding, creates a harsh and potentially dangerous environment for detainees.  Compounding the problem is the deteriorating condition of many generators, which the ISF now seeks external support to repair and maintain.  The directorate  has also acknowledged a lack of resources to secure sufficient fuel for generator operation and heating during the winter, and has  requested assistance from donors.

1. In an attempt to address power deficiencies, some ISF detention center commanders previously secured complimentary generator subscriptions from various local sources, including municipalities, institutions, and even private residences. While this approach provided a temporary solution, it has become increasingly unreliable.  The growing trend of homes adopting solar power in mountainous areas has led many residents to discontinue generator use, leaving nearby detention centers without a backup power source.bThe Commission documented this issue in several facilities, where electricity is now limited to just two or three hours per day.

Fifth: Communication

1. International law, including conventions against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and human rights conventions, firmly guarantees detainees’ right to contact the outside world. Promptly informing family members and legal representatives of a person’s detention is crucial. This protects individuals from the risk of enforced disappearance and ensures they can access legal counsel and support from loved ones.

1. Lebanon’s amended Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly enshrines the right of detainees to contact the outside world. It states that “The suspect or person complained of shall, from the time of being taken into custody for the purposes of the investigation… contact a member of his family, his employer, a lawyer of his choosing or an acquaintance.” It is important to note that this right is guaranteed before the last amendment.  

1. Memo No. 65 2020 dated 16/3/2020 issued by the ISF General Directorate allows every detainee to contact his/her family in person once a week. In addition, Memo No. 482/204, dated 14/6/2023, is based on the approval of the Public Prosecution Office at the Court of Cassation No. 1975, dated 25/10/2023. It allows video calls as a substitute for in-person visits for detainees who lack family visitors or haven’t received a visit in over six months. These video calls must take place in a private prison room and can connect detainees with parents, family members, lawyers, or embassy representatives for foreign detainees.  Video calls are granted monthly upon request submitted by the detainee to the prison commander.
2. Given the extended detention periods experienced by some individuals held in Lebanese facilities, including police station cells, judicial police units, and even courthouses, which essentially function as prisons, it is recommended that the prison law be formally extended to encompass these detention centers. This would ensure detainees held in these facilities benefit from the protections and regulations outlined in the prison law, including these two memos concerning contact with the outside world.

1. The Commission documented concerning inconsistencies in ISF detention centers regarding the right to contact with the outside world.  Some platoons, police stations, and judicial detachments completely denied detainees this right. These facilities often claimed they were not prisons and lacked the necessary Telecart machines for facilitating communication.  Even more troubling, some centers violated Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by preventing detainees from contacting lawyers.  This action was sometimes justified under the false pretense of preventing lawyers from instructing detainees to fabricate statements.  Specific locations where these violations were observed include, but are not limited to, the Amioun Platoon, the Halba Judicial Detachment, the Saida Judicial Detachment, the new Saida police station, and the Douma police station.

1. In contrast, a majority of ISF centers permitted detainees limited contact, typically only with facility staff.  Detainees would then rely on staff to relay messages and requests to family or lawyers, often before scheduled visits.  This system introduces an element of uncertainty and depends largely on the individual staff member’s character.  There is a potential risk of financial extortion or bribery associated with such an arrangement.

1. A smaller number of ISF centers provided a more direct approach, allowing detainees to use mobile phones for calls.  The frequency of this access varied depending on the center and the discretion of individual officers, raising concerns about a lack of standardized procedures.

Sixth: Meetings/visits

1. Lebanese and international law guarantee detainees the right to receive visits mainly:  Article 69 of Decree No. 14310, Article 70 of Decree No. 14310, Paragraph 4 of Principle 18 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 19 of the same body, Rule 28 of the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders known as the “Bangkok Rules”, Decision No. 42/2023 of the Public Prosecution Office at the Court of Cassation addressed to the General Directorate of Internal Security Forces, Memo No. 482/204 dated 14/6/2023, read together with the approval of the Public Prosecution Office at the Court of Cassation No. 1975/2023 dated 25/10/2023, and amended Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

1. The Commission’s observations during visits to detention facilities across Lebanon revealed concerning inconsistencies in upholding this right.  Similar to the right to contact the outside world, visitation practices lacked uniformity across detention centers.

1. Visit policies varied considerably across detention facilities.  Some police stations allowed visits only on Mondays and Thursdays, while others permitted them on Tuesdays and Thursdays. 

1. The frequency of visits also ranged from daily to just three days per week.  The Ministry of Defense Prison stood out as the only facility entirely prohibiting visits.

1. Food provision policies also lacked consistency.  Certain police stations allowed daily food deliveries even when visits were not permitted, while others restricted food to visitation days only.  LA detention centers, in contrast, completely banned outside food.  

1. Visit duration was another point of inconsistency, with some police stations limiting visits to as little as two minutes, while others allowed 15 or 30 minutes.  In some cases, there were no predetermined time constraints, leaving the duration up to the detainees’ discretion.

1. The physical arrangements for visits also differed significantly.  Some police stations conducted visits through barred windows with military personnel present.  The distance between detainees and visitors ranged from one to three meters in other facilities, and some locations even prevented visual contact, allowing only auditory communication.  In contrast, the Cybercrime and Intellectual Property Bureau provided a private room for visits, supervised by military personnel, with the duration determined by the detainees.

1. While visitation policies generally lacked uniformity, some detention centers implemented discretionary exceptions upon orders from superiors.  These exceptions might involve opening cell doors to allow physical contact between detainees and family members or facilitating meetings in the station commander’s office.  These decisions were often made on a case-by-case basis, considering the specific circumstances of the detainee (such as a former ISF member in the Helou Barracks police station).

1. The Commission also documented instances where detainees never received visitors.  Reasons for this included family estrangement due to the detainee’s actions, foreign detainees with families abroad, or financial constraints preventing families from traveling to distant detention facilities.  

1. Some families missed scheduled visits due to travel time or socioeconomic challenges (arriving after 5:00 p.m.).  In these situations, the response from detention center commanders varied depending on individual discretion.

Seventh: Healthcare

1. Health care is considered a right of the persons deprived of their liberty, as guaranteed by international and national legislation: Articles 53 and 54 of Decree No. 14310, Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Principle 24 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, and Rules 24, 27 and 30 of the Nelson Mandela Rules.

1. The Commission’s observations revealed a disparity in access to medical care across detention facilities.  LA detention centers, situated within military barracks with close proximity to military medical services, offered a higher standard of care.  Detainees in these facilities benefited from daily medical examinations by doctors, on-site nurses, and access to medications.  Additionally, emergency response protocols ensured swift intervention and transfer to military hospitals for advanced treatment, if necessary.  Furthermore, to prevent the spread of disease, LA detention centers implemented a policy requiring detainees to undergo a medical evaluation and obtain a certificate of fitness before entering prison.  Those who had been subjected to physical abuse, by either military personnel or civilians, were also barred from entering prison until they received proper medical treatment.

1. In contrast, the Commission documented instances of collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in some detention centers.  This collaboration involved the ICRC providing essential medications for detainees and software to manage their personal and medical records.

1. Detainees in police stations typically rely on family members to obtain medications prescribed by the ISF medical center.  Staff distribute these medications at designated times.  However, this system fails many detainees who lack financial resources or family support for acquiring necessary medications.  Furthermore, ISF pharmacies and medical centers often lack essential supplies.

1. Emergency response also presents challenges.  While the Lebanese Red Cross transports detainees to hospitals in emergencies, the ISF medical center only covers emergency room admission fees.  Detainees are responsible for all additional expenses, including x-rays, surgery, and other treatments.  This financial burden can result in the denial of necessary medical care and the return of detainees to detention centers without treatment, even for serious conditions.

1. Given the extended periods of detention now experienced in many ISF facilities, which have essentially become prisons, medical practices should be reformed to align with prison standards.  This includes mandatory pre-detention medical examinations, regular checkups to monitor for contagious diseases, isolation protocols when necessary, and readily available medication for chronic conditions and substance abuse recovery.  Additionally, mental health evaluations and follow-up care should be provided throughout detention to facilitate successful reintegration into society upon release. 

Eighth: Equipment and infrastructure in detention centers

1. The conversion of police stations into de facto prisons housing detainees for extended periods, often exceeding a year, has resulted in severe overcrowding and the rapid deterioration of these facilities.  Strained by the ongoing economic crisis and the constant use of allocated equipment, the ISF Department of Buildings has suspended maintenance and repairs.  The Commission’s observations during visits to these detention centers highlight the concerning conditions.

1.  In some ISF police stations equipped with surveillance cameras, the Commission documented instances where cameras were positioned to directly observe bathroom entrances.  This practice violates detainee privacy and contravenes international human rights standards, including the right to privacy.

1. Bathroom facilities within many police stations are inadequate and unsanitary.  Some lack doors entirely, while others have only curtains for partitions.  Poor lighting, ventilation issues, broken fixtures, and a pervasive unpleasant odor were commonly observed.  In some cases, bathrooms are misused for storage of water jugs, garbage bags, or other items. The privacy of detainees is further compromised by the low walls in some bathrooms, which are less than a meter high.  Additionally, a lack of proper drainage thresholds allows shower water to seep into cells, leading to mold growth on mattresses and blankets.

1. Detention facilities often lack adequate climate control, creating harsh living conditions for detainees, especially in overcrowded spaces.  The ISF General Directorate has authorized receiving air conditioners from donors, but the associated costs and bureaucratic hurdles make it difficult to secure such donations.  Furthermore, power outages and unreliable electricity supplied by generators with limited capacity further restrict air conditioning use.  The ISF Buildings Department also lacks the resources to repair malfunctioning air conditioning units.

1.  The situation is compounded by the lack of windows in some basement and upper-floor detention areas.  Extractor fans are essential for removing unpleasant odors from bathrooms, sweat, and cigarette smoke, but the Commission documented numerous instances of missing or broken extractor fans, despite repeated requests for repairs to the ISF Buildings Department.

1. In the absence of air conditioning or functional extractor fans, some detention centers rely on portable fans installed on cell doors for basic ventilation, particularly during the summer months.  However, these fans are not provided by the ISF and must be purchased by detainees or their families.  Detainees who cannot afford fans endure unventilated cells with unpleasant odors, increased risk of allergies, and potential outbreaks of scabies during periods of extreme heat.

1. Water leaks and high humidity pose significant challenges in many detention facilities, particularly older buildings.  These conditions lead to mold growth on mattresses and blankets, unpleasant odors, and potential health risks associated with dampness.  The ISF Buildings Department’s financial constraints hinder addressing these issues.  The Commission observed numerous instances of moldy bedding, with insufficient resources for replacement.  In some cases, the ISF relies on assistance from private organizations, but their contributions often fall short of meeting the needs.

1. The Commission further documented concerns regarding insect infestations within and around detention centers, likely due to a combination of humidity and inadequate sanitation practices.  While some officials initially displayed a lack of urgency, the Commission noted improvements after raising these concerns.  Specifically, some detention centers had secured assistance from municipalities for spraying insecticide and cleaning surrounding areas to control rodent and insect populations.

1. The lack of access to outdoor exercise and sunlight in ISF detention centers constitutes a significant health concern.  Detention exceeding a year without these basic needs being met violates detainees’ rights to dignity and humane treatment.  Furthermore, the absence of sunlight exposure, combined with mold growth and potentially poor water quality, can contribute to the spread of scabies and allergies.  Additionally, inadequate ventilation due to malfunctioning extractor fans, coupled with crowded conditions and high smoking rates, creates a respiratory health hazard, potentially leading to asthma, shortness of breath, and other lung diseases.  The chronic stress associated with these harsh living conditions is likely to exacerbate other health issues.

1. Compounding the issues is the lack of designated laundry drying areas.  Detainees are forced to wash clothes in bathrooms, but then have no suitable space to hang them to dry.  In response, some detainees resort to tearing up clothing or blankets to fashion makeshift clotheslines, a practice that is officially prohibited.  The Commission also observed instances where detainees used plastic ropes, electrical wires, or other unauthorized materials for drying laundry.  These unauthorized materials pose a significant safety risk, as they could potentially be used for self-harm or assault.

1. The absence of secure safes for detainee belongings in ISF detention facilities, including police stations and platoons, creates a vulnerability.  Detaining authorities often allow detainees to keep cash, which they can then use to purchase items from nearby shops via delivery services.  However, this practice contravenes regulations requiring valuables to be deposited and documented.  Furthermore, unsecured cash increases the risk of extortion among detainees or between staff and detainees, and potentially fuels gambling or violent altercations.

1. The Commission also documented instances of staff members providing detainees with lighters to discourage them from repeatedly requesting lights for cigarettes.  While seemingly convenient, this practice directly contravenes regulations and poses a significant fire hazard.  This danger was tragically realized in the October 24, 2023 fire at the Ehden police station, where detainees set fire to mattresses and blankets, resulting in the deaths of two individuals from smoke inhalation.

                 

Ninth: Conditions of security forces

1. The security forces in charge of protecting citizens, achieving security, undertaking investigations and guarding prisons and detention centers feel insecure for many reasons:

• Erosion of the value of salaries that have become no more than one hundred US dollars.
• Waiting for assistance and aid to operate the public facility, such as the electricity, stationary, detergents, feeding detainees and securing their medication. 
• Lack of healthcare for members and officers.
• Lack of school allowances.
• Necessity for members to engage in a second employment to secure living. 
• Desertion.

All these factors reflected negatively on the performance of members and officers. Therefore, without improving their conditions, optimizing performance and holding someone’s accountable cannot be achieved when committing any mistake. 

Tenth: Unequal allowances to arrested individuals by some associations

1. Through on-site visits, we noticed that more than one association is providing legal, food, and medical assistance and assistance relating to personal hygiene only to Syrian people, leading to a feeling of inequality among other nationalities in detention centers, especially the Lebanese people. The Commission warns that these practices will create hate in detention centers, which may develop into violence acts against Syrian detainees.      

Eleventh: Security tensions in Southern borders and detention centers

1. Escalation of security tensions along the southern border have forced the ISF to close several police stations in at-risk border areas, particularly those under the Tyre and Nabatieh detachments.  These closures include the police stations of Borj al-Moulouk, Rashaya al-Fokhar, and al-Khiyam (under Nabatieh authority) and Alma Al-Shaab, Ramia, Bint Jbeil, Debel, Ain Ebel, and Rmeish (under Tyre authority).  However, the associated prisons in these areas – Tibneen, Tyre, Bint Jbeil, and Marjayoun – remain operational.  The previously damaged Nabatieh Prison completed repairs in November 2023 and is now ready to house detainees from the border villages.  In anticipation of a wider conflict, the Gendarmerie Command has also secured space within Roumieh Prison to accommodate a larger number of detainees.

1. These actions demonstrate the authorities’ commitment to prioritizing detainee safety by removing them from potential combat zones.  Consequently, detainees in southern Lebanon have been relocated from areas close to the war zone to safer locations.

Chapter IV: Allegations of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in detention centers

First: Legal framework

1. The Lebanese Parliament ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment under Law No. 185 of 24/5/2000, and then ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) under Law No. 12 of 05/09/2008.

1. The Law No. 65/2017 on the Punishment of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment was passed, whereas a national law has been in force to criminalize torture acts conducted, incited or approved, explicitly or implicitly, by an official employee or any person that acts in his/her official capacity during enquiry, preliminary interrogation, judicial investigation, trials, and execution of penalties.

1. In March 2018, the Human Rights Committee considered in Lebanon’s third period report on the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the Covenant) that Law No. 65/2017 does not meet the requirements of article 7 of the covenant.

1. The National Human Rights Commission that includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture considers that the current law on criminalizing torture, Law No. 65 of October 26, 2017, and suggestions relating to its amendment that were discussed by parliamentary committees does not meet the requirements of article 7 [3] of the covenant because: (a) It limits the definition of torture in cases of investigation, interrogation, judicial investigation, trial, and penalty; (b) It doesn’t criminalize cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (c) It includes the statute of limitations for prosecuting torture; (d) It imposes penalties that don’t reflect the seriousness of the crime; (e) It doesn’t stipulate on effective remedies and redress (articles 2 and 7). 

1. Some state actors, including judicial judges, have attempted to condone torture or ill-treatment based on the exception in the Convention regarding “legal penalties”. Whereas, any “legal penalties” should be interpreted in accordance with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) and the general principle of international law contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”. In this regard, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Nils Melzer, stated that some practices, including prolonged solitary confinement and corporal punishment, cannot be considered legal penalties. Furthermore, certain circumstances and practices often accompany or contribute to acts of torture and ill-treatment, including, for example, criminal justice systems that rely excessively on confessions as the main source of evidence, and are therefore likely to resort to coercive interrogation techniques in order to extract coerced confessions or testimonies.

Second: Torture allegations in detention centers

1. The Commission’s experts conducted 841 interviews with detainees in detention centers in all Lebanese regions. Accordingly, 83 of the detainees, (about 10%), claimed that they were beaten in police stations by investigating non-commissioned officers or during their arrest. The major police stations are those of Bourj Hammoud, Antelias, Jounieh, Dekwaneh, Beiteddine, Sheheem, Aley, Mreijeh, and Ouzai. It should be noted that some of these detainees claimed that they had been beaten by drug control divisions.

1. Some detainees, 130 out of 841 (15.5%), claimed to have been beaten and tortured by the ISF Information Branch, the LA Intelligence, the Criminal Investigations Division, the State Security, and the Military Police, especially in Ablah and Baalbek. While 41 of them (31.5%) claimed to have been beaten by the ISF Information, 71 (55%) said they had been beaten by the Army Intelligence. 

1. The Commission received reports of beatings and ill-treatment in some detention centers.  One such case involved a detainee at the Bourj Hammoud police station who alleged torture and beatings.  However, during the subsequent investigation by the ISF Inspectorate General, the detainee recanted his initial statements.  He later confided in the Commission’s team that he withdrew his accusations under pressure during the follow-up investigation.  This incident highlights the challenges in investigating potential mistreatment due to possible coercion of detainees.

1. Therefore, although no cases of torture were detected by members of police stations , there were many allegations of beatings and torture by the ISF Information Branch or the LA Intelligence Branch.

1. Experts detected cases of ill-treatment in some LA detention places, such as blindfolding during interrogation and preventing the detainees from meeting their lawyers privately. There are many allegations of torture by the LA Intelligence inflicted by both detainees and those being interrogated.

Third: Main detention centers where torture allegations were recorded 

1. Through on-site visits to the lockups and detention centers mentioned in the body of this report, the Commission noticed, after interviews with detainees, that some of them alleged being subjected to torture, whether during arrest, during prior interrogation before their transfer to the police station or platoon, during interrogation in the police station or platoon where they were detained, or after the completion of interrogation actions for disciplinary or revenge purposes. 

1. Through interviews that experts made with detainees in the visited detention centers, the Commission will show the bodies and places, where some detainees alleged being subjected to torture acts. 

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation in the platoon of Al Heri-Chekka, where he was beaten, insulted, and forced to sign.

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation before the Military Intelligence in Al Qobbeh, where he was beaten. He alleged that interrogation was inhuman as he was blindfolded and handcuffed. He was suspended and got beaten on his stomach. The report was drafted and he was forced to sign.

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation in the platoon of Batroun, where he was beaten lightly. Also, another detainee alleged that he was tortured in the platoon of Batroun, where he was beaten in the detention room.

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation in the police station of Dahr Al Ain, where he was beaten. He alleged being insulted and forced to sign the statement. 

1. Some detainees alleged that they were tortured during their interrogation before the Military Intelligence at Sheikh Abdallah Barracks and Ablah Barracks, where they were violently beaten and forced to sign their statement without reading it. One of them was handcuffed and attached to the door for hours. 

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured by the Information Division during his arrest. He alleged being beaten and handcuffed with hands behind his back for around eight hours. 

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation in the police station of Talya, where he was beaten and forced to sign his statement without reading it. 

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation in the police station of Baalbek, where he was beaten and forced to sign his statement without reading it. 

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation at the Military Police, where he was beaten. He was interrogated while being blindfolded. He also signed the report while being blindfolded. 

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation before the military security at the Ministry of Defence.

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation at the Centre of Intelligence in Al Qaa, where he was beaten during interrogation.

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his arrest in the police station of Al Qaa, where he was beaten.
2. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation in the police station of Baalbek by beating him during interrogation or detention.

1. Some detainees alleged that they were tortured by the Intelligence of Jounieh, where they were beaten and humiliated.

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation at the Ministry of Defence, where he was beaten and humiliated. 

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation before the Military Police in Sarba.

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation at the Information Division in Jdeideh by beating him and forcing him to confess things that he didn’t commit. 

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation in the platoon of Ghazir.

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation by a member of the Central Criminal Investigations Office during interrogation. He alleged that he was badly beaten. 

1. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation in the platoon of Dekwaneh, where he was beaten by an investigating officer in the police station of Bekfaya to force him to confess a theft. 

1. Two detainees alleged that they were tortured during their interrogation in the platoon of Jdeideh, where they were severely beaten by a patrol of the army and the Information Division of Jdeideh, when they were arrested.
2. A detainee alleged that he was tortured in the platoon of Al Basta, where he was beaten by the Information Division during his arrest.
3. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation in Helou Barracks (platoon of Msaytbeh) by stepping on his back and beating him.
4. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation in the platoon of Beirut Downtown, where a patrol of the investigation detachment of Beirut beat him while arresting him.
5. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation in the platoon of Damascus road, where he was subject to verbal abuse and beating.
6. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation in the platoon of Dekwaneh by beating him and cutting his hair.
7. A detainee alleged that he was tortured during his interrogation in the platoon of Antelias by beating him.
8. A detainee alleged that he was tortured in the platoon of Broummana, where he was severely beaten by the Military Intelligence while arresting him.
9. A detainee alleged that he was tortured in the platoon of Bekfaya, where he was beaten, insulted, and humiliated by the members of the Municipality of Bekfaya while arresting him.
10. A detainee alleged that he was tortured in the platoon of Sin El Fil, where he was severely beaten by a patrol of the Information Division while arresting him in the region of Choueifat.
11. A detainee alleged that he was tortured in the Palace of Justice of Baabda, where he was beaten and insulted by the Information Division while arresting him.
12. A detainee alleged that he was tortured in the Palace of Justice of Baalbek, where he was beaten and forced to confess by the members of the Military Intelligence during his arrest in Dahr Al Baydar.
13. A detainee in the lockup of the Palace of Justice of Jdeideh alleged that he was tortured by being beaten and blindfolded by the members of the Intelligence of Mount Lebanon during his arrest.
14. A detainee in the lockup of the Palace of Justice of Jdeideh alleged that he was tortured by being beaten and blindfolded by the members of the Military Police in Al Rayhaniyeh. 
15. A detainee in the lockup of the Palace of Justice of Saida alleged that he was tortured by being beaten by the investigation department of Saida. 
16. A detainee in the lockup of the Palace of Justice of Saida alleged that he was tortured by being beaten in the police station of Jezzine.
17. Some detainees alleged that they were tortured in the police station of Al Mreijeh, where detainees are sometimes beaten by guards, whenever those guards are provoked. 
18. A detainee alleged that he was tortured by members of the Intelligence of Sarba during his arrest. He was later beaten under investigation after his transfer to the Centre of Intelligence of Mount Lebanon.
19. A detainee alleged that he was tortured by the Military Intelligence in Saida during his interrogation. 
20. A detainee alleged that he was tortured as he was beaten on a daily basis while being blindfolded, tied with ropes and beaten on his legs by the Intelligence of Zahle during his arrest.
21. A detainee alleged that he was tortured by the Military Intelligence in Baalbek. He was subject to electrocution through an electric gun. He lost consciousness twice during six hours. He was transferred later to the Intelligence of Ablah, where he remained 8 hours and was beaten and humiliated while being blindfolded.
22. The experts monitored a degrading and inhuman treatment while visiting the Anti-Cybercrime and Intellectual Property Protection Bureau, which sometimes undertakes investigations with some journalists (in violation of the law) and activists. During the visit, experts noticed that the lockup included a detainee affected by rabies. The detainee was not treated and members were making fun of him. While interviewing detainees, experts were interrupted by more than one member, especially when a detainee mentioned that he was beaten by an investigator. They dealt with the expert in an inappropriate manner.  

Chapter V: Violations related to the transfer to trial

First: Legal framework

1. The Rule 73 of the Nelson Mandela Rules (The United Nations Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners) stipulates that when prisoners are being removed to or from an institution, they shall be exposed to public view as little as possible, and proper safeguards shall be adopted to protect them from insult, curiosity and publicity in any form. The transport of prisoners in conveyances with inadequate ventilation or light, or in any way which would subject them to unnecessary physical hardship, shall be prohibited. The transport of prisoners shall be carried out at the expense of the prison administration and equal conditions shall apply to all of them. 
2. Under article 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law No. 328 of August 2, 2001), once the notification procedure has been completed, the Public Prosecutor’s office shall transmit the case file to the Criminal Court after ordering the detained accused to be brought to the detention centre at the court. Also, under article 237, the President of the Court or an Auxiliary Judge delegated by the President shall question the accused who has been produced before it prior to the court hearing.
3. The article 217 of Law No. 17 (Organization of Internal Security Forces) of September 6, 1990 stipulates that the members of Internal Security Forces are authorized to arrest individuals in many cases, mainly in execution of a court order, a judicial warrant, a request by the authorized judiciary or the officers of the Judicial Police, or automatically in the case of red-handed felony and misdemeanor which carry a prison sentence, provided that they shall notify the competent judicial authority immediately and abide by its instructions. In the first three cases, they shall transfer the detainee to one of the places of execution of court orders or to the judicial authority that issued the warrant or request within 24 hours as of making the arrest. In the case of red-handed felony and misdemeanor, the competent judicial authority shall have the right to extend this deadline exceptionally, if the needs of the investigations require so, provided that this deadline does not exceed three days in all cases. Furthermore, under article 212 of the same law, security forces are authorized to delegate the transfer of the military members who are convicted or arrested at the judicial level and house them at night, if required, in the centers of Internal Security Forces, in preparation for their transfer the next day. 
4. According to statistics of the Directorate of Prisons at the Ministry of Justice, the distribution of incoming prisoners and the effect of transfer from prisons led to not transferring 4438 prisoners to courts 6410 times until the end of 2023. The distribution of incoming prisoners and the effect of transfer from lockups resulted in not transferring 1123 prisoners to courts 1619 times until the end of 2023. The overall rate of non-transfer reaches 36% of the overall number of times of requesting to transfer the prisoner to investigation or courts.   
5. The Commission’s experts documented several violations and logistical challenges associated with transporting detainees to court appearances in both LA and ISF detention centers.  

Second: Regarding the Army

1. The Lebanese Army does not have any problems with transporting the detainees to military courts. The vehicles are secured, the staff members are there, and there is no delay or problem regarding these issues. However, the LA army faces a problem when transporting detainees to the General Security departments. In fact, after they used to receive detainees immediately, as stated by the prison commanders met by the Commission, they began to delay the process, under the pretense that no places were available for them.

1. Detainees held in trust for the Public Prosecution Office at the Court of Appeal, who constitute the majority of LA detainees, pose a unique challenge.  The ISF refuses to admit these detainees due to overcrowding concerns in their prisons and police stations.  However, the law prohibits the Military Police from transporting them directly to court.  This creates a logistical bottleneck, as detainees admitted by the ISF for court appearances cannot be returned to Military Police prisons afterward, further delaying their court appearances by the ISF. An exception to these challenges exists in the North region, where the Military Police Commander authorized a streamlined process.  Army personnel transport detainees to the court but remain outside, handing them over to ISF members who are legally responsible for courtroom appearances.  After the court session, the ISF returns the detainees to the Military Police prison, facilitating a more efficient and humane detention experience by minimizing unnecessary delays and overcrowding. This innovative solution could be applied more broadly to alleviate the strain on LA detention centers and ensure timely access to justice for all detainees.

Third: Regarding the Internal Security Forces

1. The Central Prison Unit Transportation Group is responsible for transporting detainees from the Central Prisons (Roumieh Prison, Baabda Women’s Prison, Beirut Palace of Justice Police Station, and the Juvenile Prison in Dahr al-Bashaq) to the competent courts. This group does not face any logistical challenges related to vehicles, as these have been repaired in collaboration with associations and donors. However, the group is understaffed. They do provide BOX vehicles to other units and stations if there is any risk involved in transporting detainees. 
2.  Transportation of detainees and prisoners to military courts is mandatory and secure, as violators are subject to legal penalties. However, the unit responsible for transporting detainees to military courts is forced to wait until the end of the sessions to return them to the detention center. This waiting time is excessive and prevents the unit from carrying out other tasks.
3. Although failure to appear in civil courts can result in fines and penalties, the Internal Security Forces (ISF) often cite a lack of vehicles, personnel, or other more important tasks (investigations, raids, or protests) as reasons for not transporting detainees. However, the unit transporting detainees to civil courts can deposit them at the Justice Palace and then transport other detainees to other courts or continue with its other tasks and return later to pick up the detainees from the Justice Palace.
4. More than 80% of detainees in ISF detention facilities are held on behalf of other units, and it is the responsibility of the arresting unit, not the detaining unit, to transport them to court. It is in the interest of these units to reduce overcrowding and their workload by transporting detainees in their own detention facilities before those in other facilities. Many detainees have told the Commission that they are forced to pay bribes to the staff of the centers where they are detained in order to be transported to court from other detention facilities.
5. Compounding the transportation issues, a significant number of vehicles within ISF detention centers are inoperable.  The ISF Directorate’s Vehicle Department, hampered by the current economic and social climate, lacks the resources to conduct necessary repairs.  Consequently, these vehicles rely on donations to cover repairs, maintenance, and even routine oil changes.  This creates a situation where the initiative falls upon individual unit commanders.  Proactive commanders take responsibility to secure donations, but those lacking such initiative simply submit formal requests to the overwhelmed Vehicle Department, essentially leaving the vehicles out of service.  This lack of operational vehicles significantly hinders detainee transport, especially for critical situations requiring multiple vehicles and officers due to the number of detainees or security risks.
6. Further exacerbating delays, a complete lack of coordination exists for detainees awaiting hearings in multiple courts.  In some instances, a detainee might be released on one charge but remain incarcerated due to another pending case.  In other cases, a detainee may be held in one facility while their case files are located in another.  This disorganization creates significant confusion.  When a court summons is issued to bring a detainee to a hearing, the court has no way of knowing which detention center holds the detainee or where the case files are located.  This can lead to missed deadlines, as the summons may not reach the detainee in time.  The Commander of the Military Police in the North provided a stark example.  The Abdeh police station attempted to transport a detainee to court, only to discover the detainee’s files were with the Military Police in the North, while the detainee himself remained at the Rayhaniyya Military Police prison due to logistical issues.  This lack of coordination resulted in the detainee missing the court hearing.
7. Inefficiencies are further amplified by situations where detainees are transported to court multiple times only to have hearings postponed due to unforeseen circumstances. These postponements can be due to personal reasons on the part of those involved, or because a necessary detainee from another facility is unavailable. This not only wastes valuable time and resources but can also make it difficult to reschedule transportation for the detainees at a later date, creating a backlog in the court system.
8. The location of detention facilities can also pose logistical challenges.  Detainees awaiting hearings in multiple courts may be held far from some courthouses.  While some officials may intervene to have detainees transferred closer to their homes to ease the burden on their families, this can create difficulties in transporting them to court due to the increased distance.
9. Assigning units to transport detainees to court can create staffing issues at the detention centers.  The delay in the units’ return hinders the performance of other essential tasks, such as providing food to detainees, conducting notifications and investigations, and maintaining overall security.

Chapter VI: Violations related to the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure

First: Regarding article 47 of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure (Promotion of key guarantees)

a) Legal framework

1. Law No. 191 was issued on 16/10/2020. This law amended articles (32), (41), (47), and (49) of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure, upon many recommendations by Treaty Bodies, which the Lebanese State joined and discussed its periodic reports before their different bodies. In order to enhance key guarantees and enforce defence rights, the law outlined that the interrogated person should enjoy the rights set forth in article (47) and should be informed about these rights, and that he should write down his attitude in the report under penalty of annulment of the interrogation or the investigation procedures, whether the crime was red-handed (with one exception) or not. 
2. The most important information concerning the new article /47/ is the right of the suspect or defendant to contact a lawyer of his/her choice, a member of his/her family, his/her employer or one of his/her acquaintances, the right of the lawyer to attend the interrogation or hearing before the Judicial Police, the right of the lawyer to meet his/her client privately without the presence of any third party for a maximum period of thirty minutes, the right of the suspect or defendant to appoint a lawyer upon a statement to be written in the report; i.e. the suspect or defendant does not need to mandate that lawyer by virtue of a power of attorney made before a notary. The lawyer is given two hours to arrive before starting interrogation. He/she shall have the right to join as of the point that interrogation has reached after his/her arrival. The lawyer shall be informed about the statement of his/her client. Also, the person subject to interrogation shall be informed about the quality, on the basis of which he/she has been interrogated, the suspicion against him/her, and the supporting evidence thereof. The interrogation shall be carried out under audio-visual recordings, but this part is never applied for the centers are not equipped with the necessary tools by the Lebanese government. Therefore, this part has not been examined as it was not applied from the start. 
3. The foreigner or the person who doesn’t speak Arabic cannot be interrogated without hiring a translator. The Public Prosecution must mandate a forensic doctor specialized in physical and mental health to examine the suspect or defendant by virtue of a request to be submitted by the agent or any of his/her family members.
4. Any violation of the provision established in article 47 makes the investigator, whether the judges of the Public Prosecution or the Judicial Police, vulnerable to a disciplinary penalty or a prison sentence for a period ranging from three months to one year, and a fine ranging from two million to ten million Lebanese Pounds. The application of article /47/ protects the sacred right of defence for every person, and reduces the cases of torture, inhuman treatment, and forced disappearance.
5. A large-scale study involving detainees across Lebanon would be ideal to assess the application of Article 47 during interrogations at ISF and LA detention centers. Due to logistical constraints, this report focuses on two key elements: an analysis of the amendments introduced by Article 47 and a comparison of these amendments with the realities observed during the experts’ visits to detention centers.
6. During initial visits, experts identified concerning gaps in understanding Article 47 among judicial police officers. Officers appeared to focus on specific aspects of the article while neglecting others. Additionally, application often consisted solely of recording the article in investigation files, without a clear and detailed explanation to detainees.  Furthermore, the experts observed a lack of awareness among suspects regarding their rights under Article 47, hindering their ability to benefit from these crucial protections.
7. In this part of the report, excerpts of Article 47 will be highlighted, especially the one related to the rights of detainees.

b) Detention period by the judicial police

1. According to the amended Article 47, judicial police officers are prohibited from detaining a suspect in their cells except by a decision of the Public Prosecution Office for a period of 48 hours, renewable once. The detainee should be transferred from the detention center in which s/he was interrogated to a different one provided that this is indicated in the investigation records, on pain of nullity.
2. The experts documented a significant number of detainees held beyond the legal limit of 96 hours. Some detainees were even held for months without finalized investigations. These extended pre-trial detentions constitute a flagrant violation of human rights, particularly the right to a fair trial and the right to access legal proceedings.

e) Recording the investigation and enclosing the recordings with the investigation file

1. Article 47 emphasizes the need to record in audio and video the interrogation procedures or when listening to the statements of the person complained of, starting from the moment his/her rights provided for in the article are read out.  The latter recordings should be enclosed with the record of the preliminary investigations, on pain of its nullity and/or any subsequent procedure.
2. However, the application of this article is almost impossible, given that a significant number of centers are not equipped with cameras due to the lack of financial resources, while other centers are equipped with surveillance cameras only. As for the latter that are equipped with cameras connected to a storage system, they have no ability to preserve the data for more than a few days, according to the claims of the officials in police stations. There are also no financial means to save the content on CDs or any other means of enclosing it with the records.
3. Therefore, Article 47’s requirements are not consistently implemented across all detention centers. This lack of uniform application weakens the legal framework intended to protect detainees from interrogation abuses. Consequently, detainees may be more vulnerable to violations like beatings, torture, or ill-treatment. 

f) The rights of interrogated persons

1. Article 47 safeguards the rights of those under interrogation, guaranteeing access to a lawyer, a phone call, a swift interrogation process, an interpreter if needed, and a forensic doctor upon request. These are just some of the essential protections outlined in the article’s seven clauses.
2. As for the right to contact a lawyer of their choice, a member of their family, their employer, or an acquaintance:
   The allegations made by detainees in ISF detention centers revealed that in certain centers they are not allowed to make contact before the elapse of a day or two from their detention or after the conclusion of the interrogation. This was confirmed by officials in some centers when interviewed, who deemed that such contact may be understood as a warning and consequently lead to the escape of the accomplices. Therefore, they allow contact after gathering the necessary information, or they may sensitize them to maintaining silence, hiring a lawyer, or getting around the truth.
3. Detainees in some LA Intelligence and ISF Information Branch centers reportedly alleged facing extended periods without contacting their families. In some cases, they could only contact family members after being transferred to other facilities.
4. As for the right to seek the assistance of a lawyer to attend the interrogation, or when hearing statements or interviews. The right to legal counsel during interrogation emerged as a critical concern. While some investigators commendably inform detainees of this right and facilitate private pre-interrogation consultations, a troubling trend of non-compliance was identified. The vast majority of officers and staff appeared unaware that Article 47 guarantees a private meeting with a lawyer before questioning. They mistakenly interpreted the article as solely permitting lawyer presence during interrogation, and even expressed concern that pre-interrogation consultations might hinder investigations.
5. The experts’ visits played a vital role in addressing these concerns. Discussions centered on Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, emphasizing the importance of its application. In some centers, the experts even provided copies of the article to be displayed prominently near investigators’ offices, acting as a reference for both officers and detainees. 
6. However, the list of rights distributed does not explain thoroughly the right to legal counselling which causes misinterpretation. 
7. Article 47 guarantees that if a suspect or accused person cannot afford a lawyer, the investigating judge must appoint one. This legal representation is provided by a lawyer designated specifically for such purposes by the Beirut and Tripoli Bar Associations. 
8. The Beirut and Tripoli Bar Associations play a crucial role in upholding fair trials and supporting detainees. They achieve this through two key mechanisms:

• Legal Aid System: This system provides lawyers to represent those who cannot afford them, ensuring they can participate effectively in court proceedings.
• Article 47 Committees: These committees designate lawyers to attend interrogations, safeguarding detainees’ rights as outlined in Article 47.

1. The experts’ observations suggest that Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not fully and consistently implemented across ISF detention centers. Several factors contribute to this inconsistent application:

• Resource Constraints: Some centers lack funding for essential equipment, such as interrogation room cameras and recording systems to document proceedings. Additionally, budgetary limitations may hinder the appointment of state-funded doctors to be readily available.
• Knowledge Gaps: A lack of understanding regarding the nuances of Article 47 among some officers was identified. This highlights the need for further training.
• Restricted Lawyer Access: The prevailing practice of denying detainees private consultations with lawyers before interrogation contradicts Article 47’s safeguards.
• De-prioritization: The report suggests that interrogations may not be prioritized by detention center staff, potentially leading to a disregard for detainees’ rights during this process.
• Inconsistent Use of Cameras: While security cameras were observed in some detention centers, including detention rooms, they were absent in interrogation rooms where they are crucial for safeguarding detainee rights.

1. The experts’ follow-up visits identified a positive development.  An increased number of investigating officers were observed adhering to Article 47, particularly regarding the right to a private pre-interrogation meeting with a lawyer.
2. In LA detention centers, the experts generally observed a more consistent application of Article 47 compared to ISF facilities. However, a lack of funding was cited as the reason for the absence of interrogation room cameras in a few centers. This omission is concerning, as it weakens the safeguards against potential interrogation abuse.
3. While the experts’ reports documented allegations of beatings, particularly in LA Intelligence offices, no instances of torture were directly observed. However, a troubling practice was identified in Bekaa region’s LA Intelligence centers: detainees reported being blindfolded during interrogations or transfers.
4. The experts raised concerns regarding LA’s approach to the right to a private pre-interrogation meeting with a lawyer. Discretionary power appeared to be exercised in granting this right, potentially based on the perceived severity of the case. This practice undermines the universality of the right guaranteed by Article 47.
5. The experts commended the LA Human Rights Commission’s proactive role in monitoring prison conditions. Their collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross in conducting oversight visits strengthens these efforts.

g) Main detention centers where violations were monitored

 

1. Through confidential interviews with male and female detainees in visited detention centers, the Commission noticed a violation of article 47 in more than one place and sometimes more than once. It has been also found that some investigating officers didn’t know its application rules, whereas the information had been collected from detainees that had been sometimes already arrested and interrogated by a police station, a platoon, or even another body. Therefore, the names of centers that had not been visited by the Commission would appear, but interviews were made with persons who were detained there. The names of police stations and platoons where article 47 was violated during interrogations will be mentioned without pointing out to any additional information for the safety of detainees.
2. The application of article 47 was violated more than once in the platoon of Batroun by not reading out the rights, the non-attendance of a lawyer during interrogation, and the authorization to call parents after the completion of the preliminary interrogation.
3. The application of article 47 was violated more than once in the police station of Dahr Al Ain by beating one of the suspects during the preliminary interrogation, not reading out the rights, not granting him the right to communicate, and not allowing the attendance of a lawyer during interrogation.
4. The application of article 47 was violated more than once in the platoon of Amioun by not reading out the rights, not granting the right to communicate, or the non-attendance of a lawyer during interrogation.
5. The application of article 47 was violated more than once in the police station of Hasroun by beating a person during his interrogation, not granting him the right to communicate, or the non-attendance of a lawyer during interrogation.
6. Lack of knowledge of the investigating officer of the rules relating to the application of article 47 in the police station of Beit Chama.
7. The application of article 47 was violated once at least in the platoon of Arsal by not reading out the rights, not granting the right to communicate, or the non-attendance of a lawyer during interrogation. 
8. The application of article 47 was violated more than once in the police station of Talya by beating a person during his interrogation, not reading out the rights, not granting him the right to communicate, or the non-attendance of a lawyer during interrogation, and forcing the interrogated person to sign the statement without being briefed on it or allowing him to read it.
9. The application of article 47 was violated once at least in the police station of Al Qaa by not reading out the rights, not granting the right to communicate, or the non-attendance of a lawyer during interrogation. 
10. The application of article 47 was violated in Ras Baalbek by beating a person during his interrogation, not reading out the rights, not granting him the right to communicate, or the non-attendance of a lawyer during interrogation, and signing the statement without briefing the interrogated person on it or allowing him to read it.  
11. The application of article 47 was violated once at least in the platoon of Zouk Mosbeh by not reading out the rights, not granting the right to communicate, or the non-attendance of a lawyer during interrogation.
12. The application of article 47 was violated in the platoon of Ghazir by beating a person during his interrogation, not reading out the rights, not granting him the right to communicate, or the non-attendance of a lawyer during interrogation, and signing the statement without briefing the interrogated person on it or allowing him to read it.
13. The application of article 47 was violated in the judicial detachment of Jounieh by beating a person during his interrogation, not reading out the rights, not granting him the right to communicate, or the non-attendance of a lawyer during interrogation, and signing the statement without briefing the interrogated person on it or allowing him to read it.
14. The application of article 47 was violated in the platoon of Al Heri-Chekka by beating during interrogation, not reading out the rights, not granting the right to communicate, the non-attendance of a lawyer during interrogation, signing the statement without briefing the interrogated person on it or allowing him to read it, and not bringing a forensic doctor for persons showing signs of beating.
15. The article 47 was violated in the platoon of Bourj Hammoud, where it was noticed that the investigating officer was only applying some clauses of the article during interrogation.
16. The article 47 was violated in Helou Barracks (Msaytbeh), where a detainee was not allowed to call his parents or a lawyer or request a forensic doctor.
17. The article 47 was violated in the platoon of Zuqaq Al Blat, whereas it is not fully applied, especially in terms of informing detainees of their rights and the possibility of delegating a lawyer to attend the interrogation. A forensic doctor would not be called, if a person was brought with clear signs of beating.
18. The article 47 was violated in the platoon of Beirut Downtown by an investigating officer from the investigation detachment of Beirut while interrogating a minor. He did not notify the representative of juveniles. He didn’t read out the rights to the minor, and notified his parents only after one week.
19. The article 47 was violated in the platoon of Tariq Al Jdideh, where the investigating officer didn’t read out the rights to detainees. 19. The article 47 was violated in the platoon of Mina Al Hosn by not reading out the rights to detainees. 
20. The article 47 was violated in the platoon of Damascus road by not reading out the rights to detainees. 
21. The article 47 was violated in the platoon of Dekwaneh. Violations consisted of not reading out the rights to detainees and not hiring a lawyer to attend the interrogation.
22. The article 47 was violated in the platoon of Antelias by not granting the right to make a phone call.
23. The article 47 was violated in the platoon of Bekfaya. Violations consisted of not reading out the rights to detainees and the non-attendance of the representative of juveniles while interrogating a minor.
24. The article 47 was violated in the Palace of Justice of Baabda while the Information Division interrogated a detainee. The detainee’s rights were not read out.    
25. The article 47 was violated by the Information Division of Beirut during the interrogation of a detainee in the lockup of the Place of Justice of Nabatiyeh. Violations consisted of allowing the detainee to call his parents only after the completion of interrogation. Also, he was not allowed to hire a lawyer and was not aware of the crime of which he was accused. 
26. Article 47 was violated by the members of the Information Division of Tripoli in the lockup of the Palace of Justice of Tripoli during the interrogation of a detainee. The violations consisted of notifying the detainee’s parents about his arrest only after the completion of interrogation and not offering him to hire a lawyer.
27. The article 47 was violated during interrogation with a detainee in the lockup of the Palace of Justice of Saida by one investigating officer in the police station of Haret Al Naameh and another in the police station of Jezzine. The violation consisted of not reading out the detainee’s rights.
28. The article 47 was violated in the platoon of Al Mreijeh. The violations consisted of not reading out the rights, not allowing to make calls, and the non-attendance of a lawyer.
29. The article 47 was violated in the platoons of Al Hadath and Bir Hassan and the police station of Hbeich. The violations consisted of not reading out the rights, not allowing to make calls, the non-attendance of a lawyer, and carrying out interrogation without the attendance of a lawyer.
30. The article 47 was violated in the platoon of Ouzai by not reading out the rights and not knowing about such rights by the interrogated person.
31. The article 47 was violated in the police station of Hammana by not reading out the rights, not knowing about such rights by the interrogated person, and carrying out interrogation without the attendance of a lawyer.
32. The article 47 was violated in the Anti-Cybercrime and Intellectual Property Protection Bureau. The violation consisted of not reading out the rights, not knowing about such rights by the interrogated person, and carrying out interrogation without the attendance of a lawyer.
33. It has been found that the investigating officer at the police station of Qornayel didn’t know anything about the application of article 47.
34. The article 47 of the Code of Criminal procedure was violated in the prison of the Military Police in the region of South while interrogating a detainee. The violations consisted of not reading out his rights, and allowing him to call a lawyer or his parents only after the completion of interrogation.
35. The article 47 of the Code of Criminal procedure was violated in the prison of the Ministry of Defence, where rights were not read out to a detainee. He signed the report without reading it.
36. The article 47 of the Code of Criminal procedure was violated in the prison of the Military Police in Beqaa in terms of meeting the lawyer privately, and carrying out interrogation with a person while being blindfolded. 

Second: Regarding article 108 of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure

              (Pre-trial detention)

1. Article 108 of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “With the exception of a person previously sentenced to at least one year’s imprisonment, the period of detention for a misdemeanour may not exceed two months. This period may be extended by, at a maximum, a similar period where absolutely necessary. With the exception of homicide, felonies involving drugs and attacks against State security, felonies which represent a global danger and offences of terrorism, and cases of detained persons with a previous criminal conviction, the period of detention may not exceed six months for a felony. This period may be renewed once on the basis of a reasoned decision.”
2. It is no secret that this article is not being applied or respected by judges. The overcrowding in detention centers is largely due to the violation of this legal article, which guarantees that no one’s freedom should be restricted without legal justification, despite the need to amend this article.
3. The experts’ detention center monitoring revealed a troubling trend: a significant number of detainees were held for months without interrogation or indictment. This practice potentially violates Articles 47 and 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which safeguard against arbitrary detention and extended pre-trial periods. In response, the experts investigated some cases of seemingly arbitrary detention, urging judges to uphold legal principles and expedite judicial proceedings.
4. It’s worth noting that detainees in Military Court facilities typically experience swifter trials compared to those held in ISF or judicial police detention centers, where lengthy pre-trial detentions remain a concern.

Third: Regarding article 402 of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure

              (Judicial supervision)

1. Article 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure outlines oversight mechanisms. It mandates that relevant authorities, including the Public Prosecution Office at the Court of Appeal, the Public Financial Prosecutor, the Investigating Judge, and the Single Criminal Judge, conduct monthly inspections of detention centers and prisons under their jurisdiction. These inspections aim to assess the conditions of detainees and prisoners. Additionally, each of these authorities is empowered to order detention and prison officials to implement measures deemed necessary for investigations and trials.
2. Effective judicial supervision is paramount in upholding human rights and dignity within detention centers. It serves as a critical safeguard, ensuring detainees’ access to legal representation and a fair trial, as enshrined in both national laws and international standards. Regular inspections by judicial authorities are essential for monitoring detention conditions, including health, hygiene, and food. This oversight promotes the humane treatment of detainees and protects their fundamental rights, including the right to life, dignity, and freedom from torture or inhumane treatment. Furthermore, a robust system of judicial supervision minimizes the risk of human rights violations occurring within detention centers.  By fostering a culture of accountability and transparency, judicial oversight strengthens public trust in the justice system. Ultimately, this contributes to an overall compliance with international human rights standards. 
3. Judicial oversight not only safeguards detainees’ rights, but also benefits judges themselves. By witnessing detention center conditions firsthand, judges gain a deeper understanding of the social and humanitarian challenges impacting society, justice, and the legal system. This first hand exposure confronts them with the realities of detention centers, including potential rights violations faced by detainees held without legal justification.
4. The experts’ observations suggest that Article 402, mandating judicial inspections, is inconsistently applied, with some judges only fulfilling this duty within their courthouses and on a limited basis. Given this non-compliance, the Commission plays a vital role in independently monitoring detention centers, ensuring humane conditions, and upholding detainees’ human rights.

Chapter VII: Conclusions and recommendations

First: Conclusions 

1. Minors, both male and female, are being detained alongside adults, both male and female, in ISF detention centers and often interrogated  in the absence of a juvenile representative  in contravention of the Lebanese Law on the Protection of Juveniles in Conflict with the Law or at Risk, and Article 107 of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as the international laws governing the rights of juveniles and children deprived of their liberty.
2. The lack of female officers to take care of female detainees in ISF detention centers, which increases the possibility of their exposure to verbal and physical abuse, in contravention of the articles of Decree 14310 on the rights of women deprived of their liberty and the Bangkok Rules. 
3. The experts’ inability to assess the situation in LA detention centers due to restrictions on access to information and restrictions of movements within the centers as they were always accompanied by an LA official. In addition, their inquiries, especially those addressed to the LA Intelligence, were not answered. 
4. The failure to corroborate allegations of torture  by the LA Intelligence.
5. Overcrowding constitutes the main problem in detention centers in Lebanon, as the number of detainees occupies 260% in terms of capacity, which contradicts international human rights standards regarding the space that needs to be allocated to each detainee in detention centers to ensure s/he lives in acceptable conditions.
6. Provision of small quantities of food that is of poor quality to detainees in most ISF detention centers, in contradiction of Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 58 of the Lebanese Penal Code, and Articles 77 and 78 of Decree 14310 on the right of persons deprived of their liberty to food. On the other hand, it was noted that high quality food in sufficient quantities is offered in LA detention centers.
7. The absence of a source of drinking water in ISF detention centers, and the regular water cuts, in contradiction of Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the right of persons deprived of their liberty to have their basic needs met.
8. Power outages in ISF detention centers, which hinders the use of necessary electrical appliances such as air conditioners, aspirators, and fans.
9. High standard medical care provided in LA detention places as these centers are located in military barracks and close to military medical services and dispensaries.
10. Sub-standard health care in ISF detention centers which turned into prisons by holding detainees for lengthy periods, thus requiring the application of prison conditions regarding medical examination and health care.
11. Inequality of treatment of detainees in regards with the right to make contact with the outside world, and receiving visits, in contradiction of international and national laws related to these rights.
12. The poor conditions of ISF detention centers and the violation of human conditions related to privacy, hygiene, and exposure to sunlight.
13. Problems related to transporting detainees to courts, especially for the ISF, with consequent violations of the rights of detainees, delays in conducting the trials, and the lack of coordination between officials of LA and ISF detention centers.
14. Flawed and limited understanding of Article 47 of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure by members of the judicial police, focusing on one part while disregarding the other, and  limiting  its application to stating it in the investigation records without reading it out . Add to this the ignorance of the detained suspects of their rights provided for in the article and their unawareness of the importance of benefiting therefrom.
15. The lack of a mechanism to fully apply Article 47, such as the installation of recording cameras.
16. Violating Article 108 of the Lebanese Code of Procedure, which guarantees that no person will be deprived of his/her liberty without legal justification, and disrespect of the detention period.
17. Non-compliance with Article 402 of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure on judicial supervision, except for some judges in the centers within justice palaces on limited occasions.
18. Officials’ keenness to transfer detainees from detention centers on the southern border with the expansion of the conflict and bombing to ensure their protection.
19. Based on the foregoing, the most notable violations and problems can be attributed to four main causes:

• The financial situation: The failure to secure the basic and necessary needs of detainees, such as food, drinking water, water for regular use, power supply, health care, quality rooms, and others, especially in ISF detention centers, is due to the financial conditions of the General Directorate. Additionally, the issue of overcrowding is not only due to pre-trial detention and delayed trials, but also to the disruption of work in some centers owing to the economic conditions suffered by the personnel.
• The judiciary: Compliance by the judiciary with the articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure, especially Article 108 thereof, and the prompt action of the judiciary alleviates overcrowding in detention centers and other resulting problems and violations of the rights of detainees.
• Oversight: Sometimes, the obstacle that hinders the provision of basic services to detainees is not financial, but rather lack of oversight. Regarding food, for example, the problem lies in the lack of control over the type and quality of food offered in ISF detention centers.
• Coordination: The lack of coordination between officials of LA and ISF officials obstructs their work and leads to the violation of the rights of detainees.

Second: Recommendations

a) Violations in detention centers of juveniles

1. Abstain from hearing any juvenile without the presence of the juvenile representative who should arrive within six hours of notification, subject to disciplinary action.
2. Resort to all available means when the detainee does not possess identification papers and consider his/her verbal statement insufficient.
3. Abstain from detaining juveniles with adults, even temporarily, but rather keep them in a locked room in the center until securing their transfer to juvenile centers.
4. Refrain from detaining minor girls in adult women’s centers and establish at least one exclusive center in every region or governorate.
5. Consider detaining juveniles as the last resort of reprehension owing to their young age and lack of maturity. They shall not be arrested except if they committed a felony or repeated a misdemeanor, otherwise corrective punishments, and alternative measures such as close monitoring, focused care, and placement with a family, an institution or educational centers are sufficient; or they can carry out social work for the common good.
6. Expediting trials of detained juveniles by the judiciary, release those who are supposed to be released, and transfer the rest to juvenile prisons where they follow rehabilitation and education programs that enable them to reintegrate into society.
7. Ensure the maintenance and rehabilitation of juvenile centers by relevant associations, or by the ISF Directorate, provide juveniles with food, medical and psychological treatment, and ensure visits and contact with the outside world are taking place as stipulated by laws.

 

b) Violations in detention centers of women

1. Coordinate with the judiciary to expedite decisions on women’s cases and issuing arrest warrants against them so that they can be transferred to women’s prisons, where they receive a much better treatment compared to their treatment in the centers.
2. Coordinate with national and international associations in order to meet the specific needs of women in detention centers.
3. Ensure that general practitioners and psychiatrists perform periodic check-ups on detained women to monitor their health and psychological conditions and follow up on their children if they are with them in the center.
4. Coordinate with embassies and consulates to help foreign women in securing a lawyer in the first stage, and in purchasing travel tickets for repatriation at a later stage.
5. Appoint female officials to supervise female detainees, carry out searches, and follow up on their regular needs, to prevent subjecting them to violations and abuse by male officials.
6. Increase the number of centers exclusive to women in all regions in order to alleviate overcrowding and facilitate family visits.

c) Violations in detention centers of men

Overcrowding

1. Immediate Solutions: Follow up on the issue of expedition of judicial procedures and submission of release requests to judges. Secure the transportation of arrested and detained persons to competent courts. Addressing the issue of overcrowding by the supervisors in ISF units as some centers are suffering while  others are controlled.
2. Rehabilitate and operationalize inactive centers in all Lebanese regions, especially that many  do not require substantial financial resources (examples of inactive cells include the stations of Gemmayzeh , Al-Nahr , Al-Bitar Hospital , Dhour El-Shuwair , Bteghrine , Baskinta , Ghazir , Kartaba , Casino du Liban , Baabda , Bir Hassan , Old Saida , Houla , Kfarhim , Zefta , Marjayoun , Mays al-Jabal , Al-Odyseh , Al-Abdeh , Al-Abboudiyeh , Akroum , Qaraoun , and Mashghara.
3. Future solutions: Build central prisons across Lebanese regions and governorates to accommodate all detained, arrested, and convicted persons, and alleviate the burden on police stations and justice palaces to allow for the latter to play their initial role in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, provided that these prisons become centers for rehabilitation and contribute to reintegrating detainees in society, rather than being places for punishment.

Food

1. Closely monitor caterers by the ISF supervisory committee, prison commanders, and heads of detention centers in terms of hygiene, cooking methods, the quantity of ingredients, and their conformity with the standards and specifications stated out in agreements and as per instructions provided for in the prison law.
2. Assigning a patrol in each region with the provision of food for detainees, through receipt of food from the affiliated prison.  
3. Provide ISF centers with refrigerators and allow detainees to put their leftovers .
4. Provide dry meals and canned food to mountain centers whose roads may be closed by snow for a sufficient period of time to ensure detainees and officials can survive for at least 10 days until the roads are reopened.

Water

1. Conduct regular testing of tap water in detention center bathrooms, which many detainees drink from, in official laboratories to ensure compliance with specifications and potability. This is especially important for detainees who do not have contact with their families or the financial means to purchase bottled water.
2. Task detention center staff with filling water gallons from local springs (especially in rural areas) or from water filtration stations in cities. This will provide detainees with clean water and reduce the financial burden on them and their families.
3. Request that the Internal Security Forces (ISF) General Directorate install water filters in detention facilities, similar to those in police stations. This is especially important given that these facilities have become long-term prisons lacking basic necessities. Alternatively, seek donors to install water filtration machines in these facilities.
4. The ISF General Directorate and regional heads should follow up with the Water Authority of Lebanon and local water departments to repair water networks in ISF detention facilities. Connect some centers to the public water network, as many centers currently do not receive any state water.
5. Work on securing ground-level water tanks in the courtyards of ISF-owned centers and on the roofs of these buildings. These tanks should have a larger capacity to hold more water, which can be filled by ISF or Civil Defense water tanks or by donors. The cost of transporting water in a tanker is the same whether it is filled with 20,000 liters or 2,000 liters of water.
6. Increasing water storage capacity in rented centers:Request that the owners of ISF-rented centers allow for an increase in the number and capacity of water tanks in these facilities to meet the needs of the staff and detainees.
7. Secure personal and general hygiene products for bathing and cleaning the living quarters of detainees from associations and donors. This will reduce the cost burden on the families of detainees, especially since most of them are financially disadvantaged. It will also help prevent diseases, odors, epidemics, and allergies.

Electricity

1. Work on equipping all ISF centers with concentrated solar panels on the roofs of the buildings they occupy to provide a permanent source of electricity. This is especially important given that Lebanon enjoys over 300 sunny days per year. The cost of installing and equipping these panels should be covered by national and international associations, local donors, and the ISF administration itself, as this problem is at the forefront of the challenges facing the institution.
2. Contact and coordinate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which is currently implementing a project to illuminate all military prisons in Lebanese army barracks. The ICRC is also contributing to the installation of solar panels to provide electricity to many of these prisons. It is worth noting that ISF centers and their economic situation require more assistance than Lebanese army barracks, which receive significant support from individuals and national and foreign institutions.

Contacts and Visits

1. Install Telecard machines in all ISF detention centers and provide phone card vouchers. Implement the two service memos issued by the ISF General Directorate, emphasizing equal treatment of detainees in terms of communication in detention centers.
2. Apply the Prison Law to ISF detention centers regarding in-person and video visits. This includes the duration of visits and ensuring that families can see their detained children.
3. The ISF General Directorate should issue a decision specifying the days and duration of visits, the distance between visitors, and ensuring consistency across all centers.
4. Urge ISF personnel and detention center commanders to develop a sense of humanity when making decisions about delays or cancellations of visits. This is especially important for individuals who incur significant expenses due to the distance they travel to visit their detained children, as well as for children and wives who come for visits.

Medical Care

1. Coordinate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to improve prison conditions, similar to the LA. The ICRC can also contribute to establishing medical clinics in ISF barracks and prioritize providing medication for detainees.
2. Coordinate with Lebanese and international charities to secure funding for surgeries for needy detainees and provide them with necessary medication, especially for neurological disorders, scabies, and allergies.
3. The ISF General Directorate should urge detention center commanders to coordinate with local clinics to secure necessary medications. They should also seek donors to contribute to the medical care of detainees in all aspects.
4. The ISF General Directorate should contract with a sufficient number of doctors to conduct regular checkups, even weekly, in detention centers and examine patients locally. Doctors should also inspect the food and drinks provided to detainees to ensure compliance with international standards.
5. Improve living conditions for detainees, especially addressing overcrowding, ensuring a permanent supply of electricity and water, and prioritizing nutrition. This includes considering air conditioning, heating, ventilation, humidity, clothing, bathing, cleanliness of spaces, regular changes of bedding and blankets, and providing additional blankets in winter to reduce the risk of illness.
6. Coordinate with the Ministry of Health and the LA to provide free medical treatment for detainees in government hospitals and the central military hospital. While the LA’s budget differs from the ISF’s, all parties share responsibility for mitigating the health risks of prisoners and preventing the spread of epidemics and diseases among them.
7. Prepare isolation spaces for inmates with contagious diseases or epidemics to prevent the spread of infection to all detainees.

d) Facilities and infrastructure in detention centers

1. Work on immediately removing all cameras from all detention centers as they violate the privacy and personal freedom of detainees.
2.  Repair and maintain detention facilities, especially addressing issues with bathrooms, doors, taps, and ensuring water supply for bathing and cleaning. Fix ventilation systems and air conditioners in detention centers or provide fans for ventilation. This can be done with the help of donors and municipalities if the ISF General Directorate lacks the necessary budget.
3.  Remove all ropes from detention centers and provide designated areas for hanging laundry.
4.  Keep a more stringent record of valuables and store them in a locked drawer or safe. Do not leave valuables with detainees to prevent misuse, extortion, and gambling.
5. Coordinate with municipalities regularly to spray pesticides inside and around detention facilities.
6. Address the issue of mold and humidity in detention facilities as it can cause diseases and epidemics among detainees. Replace mattresses and blankets regularly or take them out of the detention centers and expose them to sunlight on the roofs of ISF buildings to clean, dry, and reuse them.

e) Allegations of torture and punishment of perpetrators

1. The Lebanese authorities must recognize unequivocally the following issues and reaffirms that:

1. The prevention, investigation and prosecution of acts of torture and ill-treatment, bringing the perpetrators to justice and compensating the victims is not a matter of public policy, but an absolute and non-restrictive obligation binding on the Lebanese state, regardless of its treaty obligations;
2. No exceptional circumstances can be invoked to justify or condone any practice of torture or ill-treatment;
3. Individual criminal liability under universal jurisdiction does not only arise from active participation in acts of torture, but also from tacit acceptance of torture by state officials.
4. With the lack of full transparency and strict accountability, tolerance of torture and ill-treatment will remain deeply ingrained in any society and system of government. 

1. When assessing their interaction with the mandate and competence of the National Human Rights Commission, which includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the Lebanese authorities should consider: (a) whether a response has been received to allegations of torture or ill-treatment that were brought to justice or contained in the reports of the National Commission to the contractual and non-contractual bodies and that were officially communicated to the relevant departments and law enforcement agencies, or to those that were addressed in the reports of international non-governmental organizations, and whether they were effectively addressed through appropriate prevention, investigation, prosecution and compensation measures. Where this is not the case, the State’s interaction with the National Human Rights Commission, which includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, does not meet the standard of “full cooperation” defined by the law establishing the Commission and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
2. To verify that the interaction with the National Human Rights Commission, which includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, meets the standard of “full cooperation” set out in the founding law and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Lebanese authorities should in particular:

(a) Cooperate fully with the National Human Rights Commission, which includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and assists it in carrying out its functions;

(b) Provide the National Human Rights Commission, which includes the Committee for the Prevention of torture with all the information it requests, and respond to its letters adequately and promptly;

(c) Respond to its requests related to activating its role and engaging in constructive dialogue with it on these requests;

(d) Ensure that its recommendations and conclusions are duly followed up.

1.  Amend Law No. 65/2017 criminalizing inhuman or degrading treatment and/or punishment, to explicitly state that the crime of torture shall not be subject to a statute of limitations, and that penalties be imposed for cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Pending the amendments, the Anti-Torture Law No. 65/2017 should be fully respected and implemented, and allegations of torture should be investigated by a judicial investigative judge, especially upon receipt of a complaint or notification by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, within 48 hours, to decide either to dismiss the complaint or to bring it before the investigating judge without allowing any preliminary investigation or enquiry in this regard to be conducted but by it personally, except for the necessary decisions to preserve and seize the evidence and to assign a forensic doctor to examine the alleged victim of torture in case the complaint or notification’s annexes do not contain such a medical report. The investigating judge must undertake all procedures for investigating acts provided for in article 401 of the Penal Code, without commissioning the Judicial Police or any other security agency to carry out any action except for technical tasks. 
2. Investigate and prosecute individuals who have allegedly committed violations and abuses contrary to international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and domestic criminal law, according to due process guarantees and the principle of legality. To this end, amnesties for serious human rights violations must be excluded and a safe working environment must be provided for judges, lawyers and prosecutors.   
3. Abide by the commitments made to the Human Rights Council in previous years, particularly during the Universal Periodic Review, to use the Commission’s findings and recommendations as a basis for future reports on Lebanon to the Human Rights Council under the Universal Periodic Review and the human rights treaty bodies.

f) Activation of the National Human Rights Commission, which includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture

1. The ratification and publication of all executive decrees of Law No. 62/2016, to fully implement articles 7 and 30, in addition to the full respect of article 18 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and the Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (Paris Principles) adopted by the General Assembly Resolution No. 48/134 of 20 December 1993 and in the context of General Observation 1.10 of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions on adequate funding of these institutions.
2. The acknowledgement that the prevailing patterns of interaction of the Lebanese authorities with the National Human Rights Commission, which includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, do not yet clearly meet the standard of “full cooperation” established by Law 62/2016; especially in terms of allocation of budgets, issuance of the regulatory decrees, provision of a permanent headquarters, and responding to the Commission’s requests for the prevention of torture and facilitating the work of the National Preventive Mechanism (Committee for the Prevention of Torture), which prevents the establishment of an effective monitoring system and does not effectively address the majority of allegations of torture and ill-treatment brought to justice.

Annex 1: Names and categories of visited detention centers

Lebanese Army – Ministry of National Defence
Number of visits	Detention Centre	No.
1	Prison of the Police of Beirut Area in the Barracks of Fakhreddine in Ramleh Al Bayda	1
1	Prison of the Police of North Area in the Barracks of Bahjat Ghanem-Al Qobbeh	2
1	Prison of the Police of Mount Lebanon Area in the Barracks of Chukri Ghanem-Al Fayadiyeh	3
1	Prison of the Police of South Area in the Barracks of Mohammad Zougheib in Saida	4
1	Prison of the Ministry of Defence-Al Yarzeh	5
1	Prison of the Military Police in Al Rayhaniyeh-Baabda	6
1	Detention Centre of the Intelligence Division in South	7
1	Detention Centre of the Intelligence Division in North	8
8	Total number of visits to detention centers of the Lebanese Army – Ministry of Defence

Directorate General of Internal Security Forces – Ministry of Interior
Number of visits	Detention Centre	No.
Prisons
1	Prison of Baalbek	1
1	Prison of Minor Girls in Dahr Al Bacheq	2
Hospitals
1	Al Hayat Hospital	3
Lockups of Palaces of Justice
1	Lockup of the Palace of Justice of Baalbek	4
2	Lockup of the Palace of Justice of Tripoli	5
1	Lockup of the Palace of Justice of Saida	6
1	Lockup of the Palace of Justice of Baalbek	7
1	Lockup of the Palace of Justice of Zahle	8
1	Lockups of the Palace of Justice of Jdeideh	9
Lockups
1	Lockup of Beirut	10
1	Lockup of Aley	11
1	Lockup of Nabatiyeh	12
1	Lockup of Baabda	13
Platoons
1	Platoon of Ramleh Al Bayda	14
1	Platoon of Raouche	15
1	Platoon of Ras Beirut	16
1	Platoon of Achrafieh	17
2	Platoon of Batroun	18
1	Platoon of Mina	19
3	Platoon of Aley	20
1	Platoon of Bhamdoun	21
1	Platoon of Achkout	22
2	Platoon of Al Tal	23
2	Platoon of Al Sweiqa	24
1	Platoon of Zouk	25
3	Platoon of Jounieh	26
1	Platoon of Abou Samra	27
1	Platoon of Baddawi	28
1	Platoon of Minieh	29
2	Platoon of Ghbeiri	30
3	Platoon of Bourj Al Barajneh	31
2	Platoon of Al Mreijeh	32
2	Platoon of Al Hadath	33
1	Platoon of Bekfaya	34
1	Platoon of Rmeileh	35
1	Platoon of Aayoun Al Siman	36
1	Platoon of Bint Jbeil	37
2	Platoon of Baabda	38
1	Platoon of Chiyah	39
2	Platoon of Ouzai	40
2	Platoon of Choueifat	41
1	Platoon of Damascus Road	42
1	Platoon of Jwaya	43
2	Platoon of Jdeideh	44
1	Platoon of Mechmech	45
1	Platoon of Beirut Downtown	46
1	Platoon of Sin El Fil	47
2	Platoon of Damour	48
1	Platoon of Hammana	49
1	Platoon of Khiyam	50
2	Platoon of Jbeil	51
1	Platoon of Deir Al Ahmar	52
2	Platoon of Chmestar	53
2	Platoon of Burj Hammoud	54
1	Platoon of Al Basta	55
1	Platoon of Furn Al Chebbak	56
1	Platoon of Beiteddine	57
1	Platoon of Deir Al Qamar	58
1	Platoon of Tyre	59
2	Platoon of Adloun	60
1	Platoon of Chhim	61
1	Platoon of Al Heri-Chekka	62
2	Platoon of Msaytbeh	63
2	Platoon of Jisr Beirut	64
1	Platoon of Baakleen	65
1	Platoon of Aramoun	66
1	Platoon of Dhour Choueir	67
1	Platoon of Younine	68
1	Platoon of Maghdoucheh	69
1	Platoon of Bir Hassan	70
1	Platoon of Ghazir	71
2	Platoon of Majd Al Meouch	72
1	Platoon of Araya	73
2	Platoon of Jisr Beirut	74
1	Platoon of Dekwaneh	75
2	Platoon of Haret Hreik	76
1	Platoon of Bab Al Tabaneh	77
1	Platoon of Bab Al Ramel	78
1	Platoon of Al Qobbeh	79
1	Platoon of Halba	80
1	Platoon of Al Danniyeh	81
1	Platoon of Jeb Jannine	82
1	Platoon of Byader Al Adas	83
1	Platoon of Qabrchmoun	84
1	Platoon of Becharry	85
1	Platoon of Amioun	86
2	Platoon of Tariq Al Jdideh	87
2	Platoon of Zuqaq Al Blat	88
2	Platoon of Antelias	89
Barracks, Detachments, and Bureaus
1	Helou Barracks-Mar Elias-Beirut	90
1	Central Anti-Drug Bureau-Youssef Hobeich Complex-Ras Beirut	91
1	Anti-Gambling Bureau-Youssef Hobeich Complex-Ras Beirut	92
1	Moral Protection and Anti-Human Trafficking Bureau-Youssef Hobeich Complex-Ras Beirut	93
2	Anti-Cybercime and Intellectual Property Bureau-Joseph Daher Barracks-Chiyah	94
1	International Anti-Theft Bureau-Joseph Daher Barracks-Chiyah	95
1	Anti-Financial Crimes and Money Laundering Bureau- Joseph Daher Barracks-Chiyah	96
1	Regional Anti-Drug Bureau-Saida	97
1	Regional Anti-Drug Bureau-Tripoli	98
1	Anti-Terrorism and Major Crimes Bureau in North at the Judicial Police Unit	99
1	Anti-Terrorism and Major Crimes Bureau in South at the Judicial Police Unit	100
1	Judicial Detachment of Baabda	101
1	Judicial Detachment of Beiteddine	102
1	Judicial Detachment of Beirut	103
2	Judicial Detachment of Jdeideh	104
2	Judicial Detachment of Saida	105
1	Judicial Detachment of Nabatiyeh	106
2	Judicial Detachment of Jounieh	107
1	Judicial Detachment of Tripoli	108
2	Judicial Detachment of Dahyeh (the Suburb)	109
1	Judicial Detachment of Halba	110
1	Traffic Detachment of Tyre	111
1	Traffic Detachment of Jdeideh	112
1	Traffic Detachment of Jounieh	113
1	Traffic Detachment of Nabatiyeh	114
1	Traffic Detachment of Baalbek	115
Police Stations
1	Police Station of Chtoura	116
1	Police Station of Doeir Centre	117
1	Police Station of Saadiyat	118
1	Police Station of Al Arz	119
1	Police Station of Talya	120
1	Police Station of Hadath Al Jebbeh	121
1	Police Station of Hasroun	122
1	Police Station of Torzaya	123
1	Police Station of Aqoura	124
1	Police Station of Ras Baalbek	125
1	Police Station of Hermel	126
1	Police Station of Al Qasr	127
1	Police Station of Al Nabi Chit	128
1	Police Station of Baalbek	129
1	Police Station of Dahr Al Baydar	130
1	Police Station of New Saida	131
1	Police Station of Haret Saida	132
1	Police Station of Tannourine	133
1	Police Station of Douma	134
1	Police Station of Broummana	135
1	Police Station of Mina Al Hosn	136
1	Police Station of Beit Chama	137
1	Police Station of Al Abassiyeh	138
1	Police Station of Tebnine	139
1	Police Station of Souq Al Gharb	140
3	Police Station of Sawfar	141
1	Police Station of Mazraat Al Dahr	142
1	Police Station of Arsal	143
1	Police Station of Al Qaa	144
1	Police Station of Lehfed	145
1	Police Station of Barja	146
1	Police Station of Sebhel	147
1	Police Station of Ehden	148
1	Police Station of Kfarhim	149
1	Police Station of Qornayel	150
1	Police Station of Ras Al Metn	151
1	Police Station of Jezzine	152
1	Police Station of Niha	153
1	Police Station of Moukhtara	154
1	Police Station of Bteghrine	155
1	Police Station of Miziara	156
1	Police Station of Old Saida	157
1	Police Station of Nabatiyeh	158
1	Police Station of Saida Shores	159
1	Police Station of Qartaba	160
1	Police Station of Bouday	161
1	Police Station of Al Taybeh	162
1	Police Station of Baskinta	163
1	Police Station of Rechmaya	164
1	Police Station of Ain Zhalta	165
2	Police Station of Abdeh	166
1	Police Station of Zgharta	167
1	Police Station of Machta Hassan	168
1	Police Station of Abdeh	169
1	Police Station of Berqayel	170
1	Police Station of Dahr Al Ain	171
1	Police Station of Sfireh	172
1	Police Station of Nahr Al Bared Camp	173
1	Police Station of Qana	174
1	Police Station of Ghbaleh	175
1	Police Station of Qobayat	176
1	Police Station of Bourj Al Moulouk	177
1	Police Station of Al Arida	178
1	Police Station of Zahle Serail	179
1	Police Station of Moualaqa	180
1	Police Station of Baabda	181
1	Police Station of Casino du Liban	182
220	Total number of visits to detention centers of the Directorate General of Internal Security Forces-Ministry of Interior
228	Total number of visits to detention centers of the Directorate General of Internal Security Forces- Ministry of Interior, the Lebanese Army – Ministry of Defence

Annex 2: List of the places of deprivation of liberty in Lebanon under the jurisdiction of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture

1- Places of deprivation of liberty under the authority of the Directorate General of Internal Security Forces – Ministry of Interior and Municipalities. This includes prisons, detention centers pending investigation, police stations, juvenile institutions, temporary detention centers at border crossings, airports and seaports, and investigation centers affiliated with the Information Division of the Internal Security Forces.

2- Places of deprivation of liberty under the jurisdiction of the Directorate General of General Security – Ministry of Interior and Municipalities. It includes prisons, temporary detention places, refugees’ detention centers, shelters for migrants and survivors of human trafficking, and temporary detention centers at land border crossings, airports, and ports.

3- Places of deprivation of liberty under the authority of the Directorate General of State Security of the Supreme Council of Defence. This includes temporary detention centers and interrogation centers.

4- Places of deprivation of liberty under the jurisdiction of the General Directorate of Customs of the Ministry of Finance. This includes temporary detention facilities at land border crossings, airports and ports. 

5- Places of deprivation of liberty under the authority of the Lebanese Army – Ministry of National Defence. It includes prisons and temporary detention centers, including military barracks, detention centers affiliated with the Military Police, and interrogation centers affiliated with Military Intelligence.

6- Places of deprivation and/or restriction of freedom that are under the authority of the security forces charged with the protection of the Parliament, consisting of Parliament Police, the Internal Security Forces, and a squadron of the Lebanese Army. This includes temporary detention centers and interrogation centers.

7- Places of deprivation and/or restriction of freedom under the authority of governmental and non-governmental organizations, under the supervision and/or under contract with the Ministry of Public Health. This includes hospitals, psychiatric clinics, quarantine places, centers for the elderly (including dementia patients), drug treatment centers, treatment centers for alcoholics and any other treatment centers that include deprivation or restriction of liberty.

8- Places of deprivation and/or restriction of freedom under the authority of governmental and non-governmental organizations, under the supervision and/or under contract with the Ministry of Social Affairs. These include orphanages and associations, boarding schools for persons with special needs, shelters for survivors of gender-based violence, shelters for survivors of human trafficking, shelters for members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community, shelters for survivors of violence, centers and homes for the elderly.  

9- Places of deprivation and/or restriction of freedom under the authority and supervision or management of diplomatic missions in Lebanon, including shelters for migrant domestic workers, shelters for survivors of gender-based violence, shelters for survivors of human trafficking, or any other shelter established by embassies and/or consulates for migrant domestic workers inside or outside the embassies’ premises. 

10- Places of deprivation and/or restriction of freedom under the authority of governmental and non-governmental organizations, under the supervision and/or contract with of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education. This includes orphanages, associations that look after them, and other types of boarding schools. 

11- Places of deprivation of liberty under the authority of the Ministry of Justice or other governmental and non-governmental organizations. This includes the juvenile correctional centers, rehabilitation centers, disciplinary centers, and all other juvenile and minor facilities.

                                                                                                        

 Detention centers are playing now the role of prisons, although they don’t meet yet the required standards for prolonged detention. The detainees in all detention centers in Lebanon are subjected to many violations that are mainly due to a severe overcrowding in these centers, which affects health and legal conditions and justice proceedings, and reduces capacity to secure enough food for all.    

[1] A list of names and visits to detention centers is attached to this report in Annex 1.

[2] The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the National Human Rights Commission including the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and do not necessarily represent the views of the United Nations, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), or the member States of the United Nations.

[3] Paris Principles, https://nhrclb.org/paris-principles

[4] The Optional Protocol, https://nhrclb.org/optional-protocol

[5] Law No. 62/2016, https://nhrclb.org/law62

[6] Establishment of National Human Rights Commission that includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture. Type of text: Decree | No. 3267 – Date: 19/06/2018, https://nhrclb.org/decree-3267

[7] Decree of Establishment of the Committee – Establishment of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture. Type of text: Decree | No. 5147 – Date: 05/07/2019, https://nhrclb.org/decree-5147

[8] Annual Report of the National Human Rights Commission for the year 2023, https://nhrclb.org/archives/1914

[9] The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) was adopted on December 18, 2002 at the 57^th session of the United Nations General Assembly under Resolution <199/57/A/RES, Date of enforcement: June 22, 2006, https://nhrclb.org/optional-protocol

[10] Law No. 65/2017 on the Punishment of Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, https://nhrclb.org/law-65

[11] Expressing opinion on amendments related to Law No. 65 on the Criminalization of Torture and Punishment of Perpetrators, https://nhrclb.org/archives/1908

[12] Law No. 62/2016, Part Three: “Functions and Powers of the Commission and the Committee”, Section Four: “Functions and Powers of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture”, Articles 22-27.

[13] Report of the National Committee for the Prevention of Torture in Lebanon to the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture for the year 2022, https://nhrclb.org/archives/1674

[14] Report of the National Committee for the Prevention of Torture in Lebanon to the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, May 22, 2022, https://nhrclb.org/archives/1674

[15] Places of deprivation of liberty in Lebanon under the jurisdiction of the National Committee for the Prevention of Torture, https://nhrclb.org/places-of-deprivation-of-liberty-in-lebanon

[16] Guidelines on National Preventive Mechanisms | National Human Rights Commission-Lebanon, https://nhrclb.org/guidelines-on-national-preventive-mechanisms

[17] Istanbul Protocol: Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2022 edition), https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/policy-and-methodological-publications/istanbul-protocol-manual-effective-0

[18] Advice of the Subcommittee to States parties and national preventive mechanisms relating to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, https://undocs.org/ar/CAT/OP/10

[19] Follow-up advice of the Subcommittee to States parties and national preventive mechanisms relating to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, https://undocs.org/ar/CAT/OP/12

[20] Protocol for national preventive mechanisms undertaking on-site visits during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic,

[21] The Code of Ethics of the National Human Rights Commission including the Committee for the Prevention of Torture https://en.nhrclb.org/code-of-ethics

[22] Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 58 of the Lebanese Penal Code, and Articles 77 and 78 of Decree 14310

[23] You can review the expression of opinion on the amendments relating to Law No. 65 on the Criminalization of Torture and Punishment of Perpetrators by the National Human Rights Commission, https://nhrclb.org/archives/1908

[24] The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 1

[25] The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 27

[26] Distribution of incoming prisoners and the effect of transfer from prisons and lockups, Ministry of Justice-Directorate of Prisons, Automated Jail Management Software, https://pa.justice.gov.lb/cont/files/20/2023_doukhoul_SAWK_P_N.pdf

[27] Provided that they are transferred to the Ministry of Justice in a timely manner (Council of Ministers Resolution No. 34 of July 3, 2012)

[28] Taking into account the restrictions on accessibility in light of the relevant provisions of international law, in particular those contained in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 (Vienna on April 18, 1961) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963 (Vienna on April 24, 1963).